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I.   INTRODUCTION
 According to prevailing tort law, a wrongdoer who can choose one 
of two courses of action, each having its own risks, and chooses negli-
gently the riskier course of action, i.e., the one that has more ex-
pected harm, is held liable for the whole damage he caused to the in-
jured party if the harm materializes. Prevailing tort law considers, 
therefore, only the harm that actually materialized and does not con-
sider that there was also a risk of causing harm in the alternative 
that was not chosen, even if a lower one. That being the case, prevail-
ing law examines only what happened in practice and ignores what 
would have happened if the injured party had been exposed, with 
certain probability, to other risks, even if lower, had the reduced-risk 
course of action been chosen. 
 Professor Ariel Porat has recently presented in a series of essays 
what he refers to as the Offsetting Risks Principle (ORP), which is 
primarily relevant to medical malpractice cases but could also be 
suitable, in his opinion, for tort law in general.1 According to this 
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 1. See generally Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Porat]. An earlier version of the article was first published in Hebrew: Ariel Porat, Ex-
cessive Liability, Offsetting Risks and Defensive Medicine, 30 TEL AVIV L. REV. 9 (2006) 
(translated by author) [hereinafter Porat, Excessive Liability]. Part of the idea appeared in 
an earlier article of which Porat was a co-author: Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Ex-
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principle, there is need for legislated change in the prevailing legal 
outcome whereby liability is imposed on injurers who have negligent-
ly chosen a course of action that caused harm to a patient, while a 
different choice was available to them which entailed a lower risk. 
According to Porat’s ORP, courts should account for the risks de-
creased by the wrongdoing as a factor mitigating liability.  
 Part II of this Article will explain the ORP as presented by Porat 
and outline some of the basic principles of tort law and how they re-
late to the ORP. Part III will discuss problems arising from an analy-
sis of the ORP and its application. Some of these problems are prac-
tical in nature and concern matters of calculation, and some relate to 
an understanding of the underlying basis for the principle. Part IV 
will analyze and criticize the comparison made by Porat between the 
ORP and theories of probabilistic causation—the lost chance and in-
creased risk doctrines. Part V will discuss the incompatibility of the 
principle with most of the goals of tort law given all of the problems 
raised in this Article.2
 The Article concludes that the proposed principle raises several, 
very serious problems: some inherent normative problems that derive 
from its incompatibility with most of the goals of tort law, and other 
technical problems that make its practical application difficult, if not 
impossible. Accordingly, it will be my recommendation in this Article 
that, although problems do exist in medical malpractice cases and 
tort law in general, the ORP should not be applied as presented. This 
is because, despite the specific problem of defensive medicine and the 
overinvestment in precaution that it attempts to remedy, the prin-
ciple is very likely to complicate the present situation in many re-
spects, make litigation more costly, and make it tangibly harder  
to evaluate the evidence in medical malpractice cases and other  
tort cases.  
                                                                                                                    
ternalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. Tort L. art. 2 (2006). 
This article refers to medical treatments only and not to the other types of the negligent ac-
tivities discussed in the latest articles. The Michigan article is more comprehensive, and 
therefore the other two articles will be cited only insofar as they deal with relevant issues 
not covered by the Michigan version. A short comment on Porat was published in the same 
JTL issue: Keith N. Hylton, Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and 
Porat, 1 JTL art. 3 (2006). Hylton supports, in principle, Cooter and Porat’s proposals and 
the reforms that they suggest and does not share the fundamental criticisms raised in this 
Article. His criticism is relevant to some of the details of Cooter and Porat’s proposal but is 
not directed at the theoretical framework. See id. at 1-2. He also raises some alternatives 
for solving the problem of defensive medicine. See, e.g., id. at 1, 5. In any case, the bulk of 
this critique is significantly different from the criticisms to be raised in this Article. Hence, 
Hylton’s criticisms will be mentioned only insofar as they are related to the points to be 
raised here. 
 2. This part of the critique has been left for the end of the Article because the theo-
retical critique will be clearer after analyzing the serious problems arising from the ORP. 
2009]              OFFSETTING RISKS IN TORT LAW 139 
 Nonetheless, if the inherent problems that arise from the analysis 
of the ORP and its application could be solved, or if the ORP were to 
be presented in another way, there could be, with all due respect, a 
place for its application in legislation and case law. However, under 
present conditions, it is hard to believe that these difficulties could 
indeed be resolved and that the ORP could be consistent with the 
goals of tort law. 
II.   A PRESENTATION OF PORAT’S OFFSETTING RISKS PRINCIPLE AND 
TRADITIONAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES
 As stated above, Porat believes there is need for legislated change 
in tort law in regard to injurers who have negligently chosen a course 
of action that caused harm to a patient, while a different choice was 
available to them which entailed a lower risk. Under Porat’s ORP, 
courts would account for the risks decreased by the wrongdoing as a 
factor mitigating liability. 
 Porat illustrates this with a basic example of a doctor who has to 
choose between Treatment A, entailing a risk of $500 (i.e., there is a 
probability of .1 that a treatment will produce a harm of $5000), and 
Treatment B, entailing a risk of $400 (i.e., there is a probability of .1 
that the treatment will produce a harm of $4000). The doctor negli-
gently chooses the former, causing a harm of $5000; the expected 
harm from the negligent choice of Treatment A materializes into an 
actual harm.3 According to prevailing law, this injurer is liable for 
100% of the harm—$5000 in the given example—even though, as Po-
rat sees it, his negligence actually created a liability of only 20%. Al-
though his negligent conduct created a risk of $500, it also eliminated 
a risk of $400—a reduction of 80%—because he did not choose 
Treatment B, which entailed a probability of .1 of a harm of $4000.  
 Porat characterizes the heightened liability currently imposed on 
doctors as “excessive liability.”4 Under Porat’s ORP, the risk posed by 
the nonnegligent choice should be offset against the risk of the negli-
gent choice. This means that injurers would only need to pay the dif-
ference in percentages between the expected harms (20% of the ac-
tual damages caused, or $1000) instead of the full harm that materi-
alized ($5000). In this way, the injurer is not just held liable (perhaps 
even “punished”) for negative externalities, i.e., for creating said rea-
lized risk of $500, but also credited for positive externalities, i.e., for 
preventing the risk of $400. Thus the injurer is only liable for the net 
risk that he created. According to Porat, the only way to truly reflect 
the social costs of a wrongdoer’s conduct and rectify distortions in 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Porat, supra note 1, at 245. Note that the probabilities of the two risks need not be 
identical—the numbers used here were chosen for convenience only.  
 4. Id. at 246.
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prevailing law is to impose upon the wrongdoer the reduced liability 
that results from offsetting risks.5
 Porat presents a formula to be used for applying the principle: 
L = ((rA — rB) / rA) · hA 6
 He explains that “when the same wrongful act that increased the 
risk that eventually was realized (rA) reduced another risk (rB), liabil-
ity (L) should be equal to the harm that materialized (hA) multiplied 
by the difference between the two risks (rA – rB) and divided by the 
risk that was realized.”7 If the formula is applied to the example, the 
wrongdoer would be held liable for $1000: L = $5000 x ($500 – $400) / 
$500 = $1000. 
 Porat calls for an adoption of the ORP into legislation as it relates 
to medical malpractice, if not all torts as well. He explains the com-
pelling logic, in his opinion, for adopting this principle and the notion 
that its statutory application would lead to a lower investment by 
doctors in precautionary measures, whereas the current state of af-
fairs is characterized by an overinvestment in such measures to avoid 
mistakes.8 There is also a danger that excessive liability might cause 
a reduction in or even the elimination of beneficial activities, even 
though this outcome is socially undesirable.9 Porat also argues that 
excessive liability results in unnecessary surgical procedures, exami-
nations, and medication; creates litigation costs; and increases the 
attorneys’ income—all at the expense of patients.10
 Porat argues that applying the ORP would reduce the scope of de-
fensive medicine,11 lower the cost of health care, improve the quality 
of health care, and help optimize the standards of various medical ac-
tivities.12 He believes that it is in the patient’s interest, ab initio, to 
be awarded partial compensation (i.e., reduced compensation after 
risks have been offset) to improve doctors’ incentives to provide bet-
ter care and ultimately to increase his own profit.13 According to Po-
rat, the legislature’s adoption of the ORP will also lead to a signifi-
                                                                                                                    
 5. Id. at 245-47 (“An injurer who fails to take these precautions creates a net risk 
equal to the difference between the risks he negligently failed to reduce and the risks  
he would have created had he taken the necessary precautions. I call the latter risks offset-
ting risks.”).  
6. Id. at 251. 
7. Id.
 8. Id. at 266-67.
9. Id. at 263, 266-67. 
10. Id. at 246, 264-66, 275. 
 11. Id. at 246, 264-66; see also id. at 264 n.47 (listing references discussing the prob-
lem of defensive medicine).
12. Id. at 264-66. 
 13. See id. at 246, 264.
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cant reduction in the huge compensation awards paid as a result of 
medical malpractice lawsuits, which send the system into a spin. 
 Porat proposes that risks related to the interests of the victim be 
offset by the decreased risk that might have been realized by the 
nonnegligent course of action that was not ultimately chosen. How-
ever, he also presents—although he does not propose to actually or 
necessarily implement this—the possibility of similarly offsetting 
risks to third parties or even to the aggregate social interest that 
were avoided and decreased by the negligent choice of a course of ac-
tion. He argues that this reflects a natural application of optimal de-
terrence.14 To implement this theory into practice would constitute a 
significant expansion of the ORP and its application. 
 However, Porat does not propose that victims be left without any 
compensation for the alternate risk. He proposes that the differ-
ence—i.e., 80%, which is $4000 in the given example—be supple-
mented by social or private insurance available for purchase by the 
injured party.15
 In fairness, Porat notes that acceptance of the ORP might encour-
age doctors and other potential injurers to artificially increase the 
anticipated offsetting risks to reduce the extent of their liability 
should harm eventually materialize.16 He asserts that a possible solu-
tion for this is to divide offsetting risks into two categories: risks that 
are present even without this artificial increase (which should be off-
set) and artificial risks (which should not be offset).17
 Porat’s suggestion is innovative and different from the traditional 
tort law treatment of the issue of risks and chances. Tort law treats 
risks in a complicated, nonuniform way throughout the world. This 
Article is not exhaustive, but it will mention a few basic principles re-
levant to the issues at hand:  
 (1) Tort law does not create liability for pure risks that do not ma-
terialize into actual harm even if it is clear that, had this risk materi-
alized, it would have entailed a tort. This is what I will refer to as an 
“incomplete tort.” For example, consider if a government ministry or 
a municipality negligently placed a road sign, and the outcome was 
increased risk to the drivers and pedestrians traveling near it. As 
long as no damages occur (not even a minor waste of time) and no ex-
penses were caused as a result of this negligent action, neither driv-
ers nor pedestrians who pass nearby can sue the authorities for plac-
ing them at risk. Therefore, in this type of case, offsetting risks are 
not relevant. This is an incomplete tort. There is a duty of care, and 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Id. at 252-60.
 15. Id. at 270-71.
 16. Id. at 273 n.71.
 17. Id.
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one may assume that it was breached, but merely placing someone at 
risk does not constitute a tort if no harm was caused. In these cases, 
it is clear that exposure to risk cannot be a basis for liability.  
 (2) When risk materializes into harm and all of the cumulative 
elements of a tort exist, including causation, tort law creates liability 
for the whole damage.
 (3) When someone is exposed to a risk that materializes into dam-
ages, but there is difficulty proving a factual causal relationship, in 
some countries a partial compensation is recognized, and its magni-
tude is similar to the magnitude of the increase of the risk.18
 (4) In some countries, tort law deals with a situation in which the 
risk that a person will be harmed or become ill increases following 
some act or omission, even if harm does not materialize, because the 
negligent act caused that person to suffer additional expenditures.19
For example, a person may be exposed to increased radiation or to in-
creased pollution following a tortious action, such as pollution dis-
charged from a factory or radiation from a cellular antenna. If the 
person is not currently ill, the tort is missing the prima facie element 
of harm. However, emotional harms, such as the fear of becoming ill, 
can be a recognized harm. If a plaintiff is healthy at the time of trial 
and the exposure to the risk has not affected him physically or mental-
ly, but he must now incur special expenses for increased periodic medi-
cal examinations, in some countries the wrongdoer must compensate 
him for these expenses. This is especially relevant in countries where 
medical insurance is private, not national, because some of these ex-
aminations, e.g., imaging or blood tests, are very expensive.20
                                                                                                                    
18. Its converse is partial compensation based on the probabilities of the loss of 
chances to recover both. Issues will be dealt with below in connection with offsetting risks. 
19. In countries recognizing torts under this fourth principle, indemnity for aggra-
vated medical expenses is generally in addition to physical damages. This is the case in 
some states in the United States regarding increased risk. See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 
771 N.E.2d 357, 366-372 (Ill. 2002) (awarding future expected damages for a patient’s in-
creased risk of developing infection after the doctor negligently left medical equipment 
within the patient’s body); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 264 (N.J. 1989) 
(awarding damages for increased risk of contracting diseases resulting from plaintiff’s ex-
posure to asbestos during employment). It is only in isolated instances that such aggra-
vated medical expense damages have been awarded in the absence of proven associated 
bodily harm. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 239 (1996) (awarding compen-
sation for costs of medical surveillance to plaintiff for the future risk of developing cancer 
resulting from exposure to hazardous materials even though the plaintiff did not prove any 
present harm or injury at the time of trial); see also Deidre A. McDonnell, Increased Risk of 
Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an Alternative to the All or Nothing System Ex-
emplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 623, 647-49 (1997) (arguing that 
plaintiffs should be allowed to recover proportional damages when a negligent action sub-
stantially increases their risk of developing disease).  
20. It is possible that some of these examinations may increase the risk of becoming 
ill, for example treatment following an exposure to radiation. 
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  The ORP, as presented by Porat, does not distinguish completely 
between principles one and two presented above. To explain it, let me 
return to Porat’s main example. As stated, the doctor has negligently 
chosen Treatment A, with an expected harm of $500, while the ex-
pected harm from another option, Treatment B, is only $400, and, in 
fact, an actual harm of $5000 has materialized. Porat claims that the 
injurer should only pay 20%, which is $1000. In a pure analysis of 
risks, it might seem logical, maybe even necessary.  
 However, it does not fit the traditional perspective of the law of 
negligence, since the choice of Treatment B would not be considered 
negligent at all, even though it also entails a risk (although reduced 
compared to Treatment A) that harm will be inflicted. This is the “in-
complete tort.” Treatment B entails harm and there is a causal rela-
tionship between the act and the harm, but the choice of Treatment B 
is not deemed negligent because there is another treatment with a 
higher expected risk. Treatment B is not a materialized risk, and 
even if it had materialized, would not have been a tort at all. There-
fore prevailing tort law justifiably does not consider it.  
 Porat proposes that the prevailing law be changed. He wishes to 
compare the risk that is realized as a result of an act, the very choice of 
which constitutes a wrong, with the potential risk from an act that, had 
it been chosen, would not be considered wrongful at all. The entire 
principle is based on a comparison between tortious and nontortious 
activity, where in both cases there is potential for harm to materialize. 
 Porat suggests that the avoided risk associated with the nonnegli-
gent alternative should be offset against the negligent risk that is 
realized into a harm and that the failure to offset risks should be 
viewed as a “windfall” to the plaintiff.21 According to traditional tort 
law, liability arises from the infliction of harm and not from the mere 
creation of a risk; and when the latter is realized, damages should be 
awarded for all of the harm sustained. This comparison to an act or 
omission which is not considered a tort is contrary to the regular 
rules of examination of the cumulative elements of a tort.22
                                                                                                                    
 21. Porat, supra note 1, at 270-71 (“[T]he definition of ‘harm caused by the doctor,’ as 
opposed to ‘harm caused by nature,’ is, at the very best, unclear. A patient who might have 
been nonnegligently exposed to an expected harm of 400 but instead was negligently ex-
posed to an expected harm of 500 which was realized into an actual harm of 5000, and is 
compensated for that harm–could be considered to have received a windfall. The reason for 
that is that, had the doctor nonnegligently exposed her to an expected harm of 400 and 
that risk materialized into an actual harm of 4000, the victim would have remained com-
pletely uncompensated!”).
 22. Not only should compensation not be reduced, as Porat proposes, but under proper 
circumstances, in accordance with court rulings on this matter in various countries like 
Israel, breach of autonomy should be added as a head of damage to the traditional award 
for bodily injury. See, e.g., CA 2781/93 Daaka v. Carmel Hosp. [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 526. 
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 There is nothing wrong with innovation itself. On the contrary, 
there is no justification for stubborn adherence to the traditional per-
ception of tort law at all costs. However, an examination of the ORP 
from both a theoretical perspective of the goals of tort law and in re-
gard to the possibility of its practical application raises difficult ques-
tions as to its compatibility with the current legal reality of medical 
malpractice cases and of tort law in general. A careful analysis re-
veals several serious, inherent problems with the central example 
that Porat uses to illustrate the principle, as well as with other ex-
amples that he presents in his article. These problems make the ac-
tual implementation of the principle very difficult. 
III.   INHERENT PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE NARROW INCIDENCE OF 
THE PRINCIPLE AND IN CALCULATING AND OFFSETTING THE EXPECTED
HARMS
 The ORP as presented can, in principle, be suitable only to the 
type of cases that were presented by Porat, i.e., when the negligence 
was caused by the choice of a certain course of action as opposed to 
another one; the negligence lies in the poor choice. Nevertheless, oth-
er cases of medical malpractice—if not the majority of them, then at 
least a large portion of them—do not reflect a negligent choice of the 
course of treatment but negligence in carrying out or omitting to car-
ry out the treatment itself. A large number of medical malpractice 
cases relate to surgery done with insufficient care; surgery that was 
done too late; failure to obtain fully informed, conscious consent from a 
patient for the treatment; or omissions such as forgetting a surgical 
pad inside the patient’s body or not discovering a tumor in time despite 
the ability and need to do so under the circumstances. These are not 
cases that involve any issue of choosing negligently between courses of 
action unless we artificially say that the doctor had, for example, two 
courses of action—to forget the surgical pad or to remove it.23
 Given this limitation, it seems claiming that the problem of defen-
sive medicine would be solved or even lessened if the ORP is applied 
is somewhat pretentious since the ORP does not relate to many types 
of medical malpractice cases. Moreover, Porat’s call to examine the 
possibility of expanding the use of the ORP beyond medical malprac-
tice cases to all negligent actions in tort24 is problematic because it is 
not clear why it is necessary to create a separate principle, different 
from the prevailing law and compatible only with a narrow scope of 
cases in which a wrongdoer has two (or more) courses of action and 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Cf. Hylton, supra note 1, at 4 (“Negligence claims usually do not involve general 
methods or approaches, such as the choice between boat or airplane transportation or the 
choice between cesarean and vaginal delivery.”).
 24. Porat, supra note 1, at 269, 275-76.
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negligently chooses the riskier one. Only in those cases would liabili-
ty be partial; in all other cases it would be full. There is no justifica-
tion for this distinction, especially given that, in cases other than 
medical malpractice, there is no defensive medicine problem.  
 Therefore, the acceptance of the ORP in legislation or case law 
will create an enormous change in tort law that will substantially af-
fect litigation costs and procedures, as detailed below. Moreover, let 
us not forget that most specific arrangements in tort law are based 
on negligence and fault. The general rule of this liability regime is 
that a wrongdoer at fault is fully liable for the harm caused, and a 
reduction in liability is possible only due to contributory negligence. 
 Even were we to accept the division of negligence law into two dis-
tinct doctrines—the doctrine of offsetting risks and the traditional 
doctrine of fault without offsetting risks in all other instances—there 
is still a problem in dealing with cases where there are several non-
negligent courses of action and difficulty and expense calculating and 
offsetting the expected harms. 
 The comparison that Porat makes in his basic example, between a 
negligent choice of a course of action with a risk of $500 and a non-
negligent choice of a course of action with a risk of $400, is too sterile. 
In that case (if one ignores the above-mentioned problems with calcu-
lating and offsetting expected harms) 80% of the actual harm of 
$5000 will be offset. However, what would be the outcome in cases 
where there are more than one nonnegligent, medically reasonable 
courses of action? Assume that there are three additional nonnegli-
gent, medically reasonable courses of action in the previous example: 
one course of action with an expected harm of $300; another course of 
action with an expected harm of $200; and, finally, an option to do 
nothing at all under the circumstances (for instance, a decision to not 
remove a tumor) with a risk of $100. Although Porat's formula is 
written to be applied to situations with more than two alternative 
courses of action, his examples focus on situations with only two rea-
sonable courses, such as the example given from the field of obste-
trics where, in a given case, a doctor negligently opts to perform a 
vaginal delivery that results in harm to the baby and fails to choose a 
cesarean delivery which would not be considered negligent in said 
circumstances but which carries dangers of its own. 25
 As we will see below, the comparison between the two choices is 
inherently problematic.26 But, if we stick with Porat’s reasoning, 
there is another problem—a cesarean delivery could entail risks of 
                                                                                                                    
 25. Id. at 264-65; Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 1-3.
 26. See Porat, supra note 1, at 270-71; Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 25; see also Hylton, 
supra note 1, at 3-4 (suggesting an alternative solution for the obstetrician example based on 
factual causation that does not require any changes to the rules on damages awards).
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different types of harm. And, under certain circumstances, there may 
be other choices available to the doctor (such as vacuum extraction or 
forceps delivery) also entailing risks of different harms and varying 
degrees of probability. (Again, the model itself is written to include 
varying levels of probability applying to different risks. It is only the 
practical evaluation of such probabilities that is problematic.) Com-
paring the risks of the course of action where one choice is negligent 
and the other is nonnegligent can be difficult, if not impossible, par-
ticularly in the field of medicine where the same treatment may pose 
different risks to different patients. 
 Should we choose the option that most favors the injurer by offset-
ting the risk generated by the reasonable, nonnegligent course of ac-
tion that could have led to the highest degree of harm among the less 
risky courses of action? Or should we choose the alternative that 
most benefits the victim, offsetting the risk that would have led to 
the largest possible differential? Would it be logical to take all possi-
ble positive externalities into account cumulatively which, in many 
cases, would lead to a situation where the injurer would not have to 
pay any compensation at all, even though it is clear that his actions 
were negligent? In my opinion, this last option is totally unacceptable 
since a comparison must be made between the risk of one negligent 
course of action and another nonnegligent course of action, and not 
between the risk of the negligent choice and an aggregation of risks 
from various nonnegligent choices.  
 Ostensibly, Porat has an answer: “[W]hen the injurer could have 
chosen among more than two options, rB [the lower risk that even-
tually was not realized] should be the risk entailed by the most rea-
sonable option among the various alternatives available to the injur-
er.”27 With all due respect, this is indeed a logical and maybe even re-
quired answer. However, how might one in practice determine this 
“most reasonable option among the various alternatives available to 
the injurer?”28 The problem lies, therefore, in the fact that there is a 
domain of reasonableness; that is, there are instances in which there 
are a number of reasonable courses of action, rather than just two—
one more risky and the other less so.  
 Courts do not determine which nonnegligent course of action is 
the most reasonable. They only examine if the chosen course of action 
is in that domain of reasonableness. There could be infinite courses of 
actions in this range, or at least more than one. The reasonableness 
of medical treatment courses of action is determined by a number of 
factors. Is the determination related to the magnitude of the expected 
harms? Note that a more probable course of action may be related to 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Porat, supra note 1, at 251-52.
 28. Id. at 252. 
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a smaller harm and vice versa. Will each case be determined on its 
own? Porat does not clarify any of that, so it is ultimately unclear 
which of the risks should be offset against the risk posed by the neg-
ligent course of action that was actually chosen. Porat proposes that 
the courts be provided with risk tables, to be established through leg-
islation, in order to guide them in the analysis.29 But is it possible for 
the legislature to provide such tables for each individual case, or to 
each group of cases? How, ultimately, would it be possible to handle 
the existence of a number of acceptable, reasonable courses of action, 
and how would such tables actually solve the problems raised here? 
 It would appear to be too complicated to calculate the risk of a 
harm that has actually materialized and then to deduct from this a 
risk that has not been realized because said course of action was not 
chosen. The multitude of necessary calculations is problematic and 
could send the legal system into a spin. It would entail numerous cal-
culations of expected harms for different courses of treatment or the 
expected harms of omissions, like refraining from medical treatment, 
as well as a calculation of the probability of the realization of each 
risk for every possible course of action.  
 Following this logic, it would be necessary to compare the risk of 
the negligent choice with those of all other possible courses of action, 
which could be infinite. In such cases it is not clear how it would be 
possible to calculate and offset the various expected harms with dif-
ferent probabilities. In most cases it is not certain that harm will re-
sult from alternative courses of action. This is just a matter of proba-
bilities, some with small magnitudes that are, for example, far from 
preponderance of evidence (like 10% in Porat’s primary example). 
Conducting this analysis would make lawsuits more costly and require 
the routine testimony of numerous medical experts to evaluate the 
risks of all possible courses of action that could have been chosen un-
der the circumstances. It would also require the testimony of experts 
in statistics who would have to evaluate the probability of each course 
of action, compare the probability of the action that was chosen with 
each course of action not chosen, and calculate the difference. 
 In truth, it may be said that the examples Porat relies on are cas-
es in which there are only two courses of action to begin with, and it 
is clear which one is the negligent choice and which one is the non-
negligent choice; the theoretical formula, however, can be applied to 
other situations. However, the problem of how to calculate and offset 
various risks also exists in the sterile examples presented by Porat 
throughout his article and would only be reduced if it were known 
with certainty, or at least by a preponderance of evidence, that harm 
would indeed be caused by the nonnegligent choice and to what ex-
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tent. This only becomes more problematic given the existence of addi-
tional, nonnegligent courses of action and background risks.  
 Beyond that, even if Porat had only intended to apply the ORP to 
cases in which there are only two courses of action, where choosing 
one of them is negligent and choosing the other one is not, one cannot 
ignore its broader necessary application in cases where there are two 
or more nonnegligent courses of action. If the intention is to apply 
this principle only where two courses of action exist, one involving 
greater risk and the other involving less risk, then we are limiting 
even further the applicability of the principle, which is already li-
mited in scope and which requires the application of two doctrines in 
negligence law. It is therefore hard to establish what might be con-
sidered a truly revolutionary evidentiary rule for tort law based sole-
ly on such a sterile case entailing only two courses of action, especial-
ly given the fact that the ORP is narrowed from the start to certain 
types of cases. 
 Furthermore, there are serious problems even if the ORP is im-
plemented only in situations in which there are only two courses of 
action because in these situations it may be that one course of action 
entails risks of different harms of varying degrees. Sometimes even 
one course of action can lead to multiple harms, and this too must be 
taken into consideration. For example, a nonnegligent course of 
treatment entails a risk of $400, but it also entails a risk of harm of 
$50 or $250 from serious side effects that may result from the same 
treatment (such as the loss of hair, loss of appetite, or impotence as-
sociated with chemotherapy). Which of these risks should be offset 
against the risk that is actually realized from the negligent choice of 
treatment? The highest risk? The lowest risk? The overall cumulative 
risk? In addition, it may be that each of those three courses of treat-
ment involves different risks for different harms, complicating the is-
sue even more. 
 But this is not the end of the problem. Even if we settle on a case in 
which there are only two courses of action and apply the ORP only in 
that case, and even if we ignore the problems presented until now, 
there is still no way of knowing whether the course of action not ac-
tually chosen, Treatment A, would indeed result in a harm. This is 
particularly true when the alternative course of action has a lower ex-
pected harm, and even if the risk would have materialized, the choice 
of this course of action would not, in and of itself, constitute a tort at 
all. Thus, there is no justification for offsetting, and the imposition of 
full liability should not be viewed as excessive, as Porat believes. 
 To illustrate the problems involved, I will use a different example 
than Porat’s, one in which the difference between the risks is consi-
derable. Let us assume that the negligent choice, Treatment A, car-
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ries a 40% risk of harm, and the nonnegligent choice, Treatment B, 
carries only a 5% risk of harm.30 A patient could perhaps argue that 
he was injured by negligent Treatment A, with a 40% risk, because 
he is more susceptible than others (i.e., than 60% of the population) 
to its dangers; whereas he is not as susceptible to the dangers of 
nonnegligent Treatment B, with only a 5% risk. Therefore, a patient 
might not have fallen into the latter category at all and not suffered 
any injury from this choice, making it illogical and unjust to offset 
such an unlikely, speculative risk.  
 Simply stated, there is no way to prove that the victim would have 
suffered harm from a course of action that was never taken. It would 
be hard to find a doctor who would testify that Treatment B, which 
was not administered, would have led, with certainty, or at least by a 
preponderance of evidence, to a specified extent of harm. It is imposs-
ible to know in advance and prove how a person will react to a specif-
ic type of treatment. 
 Porat believes that, under prevailing law, the injurer, in effect, 
bears liability that is higher than the harm caused by his negligence 
(what he calls “excessive liability”).31 However, this is the actual
harm caused by his negligence and no more; therefore it reflects his 
net liability and is not excessive. Let me explain it with an example 
given by Porat—that of overlapping risks.32 Suppose a nonnegligent 
course of action creates four risks, while a negligent course of action 
produces an additional fifth risk. Porat provides for this in an exam-
ple of risk to four of a patient’s fingers (with a .1 probability that 
harm of 4000 will occur) as opposed to a risk to five of his fingers 
(with a .1 probability that harm of 5000 will occur), where choosing 
the latter option is a negligent choice.33 True, when the risks are 
overlapping, one might feel that the doctor should be liable only to 
the extra risk. However, if all of the elements of the tort have been 
proven then the victim must be awarded full compensation, subject to 
any finding of his own contributory negligence.  
 Choosing the riskier course of action fulfills all the elements of the 
tort. In the example of overlapping risks, the elements are fulfilled—
to the fifth risk as well as to the other four. True, if there is certainty, 
at least by a preponderance of evidence, that all four elements of the 
                                                                                                                    
 30. This is only for the sake of the argument with no intention to involve the expected 
harms. Sometimes a small probability of a large damage means a bigger expected harm 
than a big probability for a small damage, as illustrated by the following: Course of action 
A—a harm of $200 with a probability of 90%. The expected harm is $180. Course of action 
B—a harm of $4000 with a probability of 5%. The expected harm is $200. Choosing course 
of action B is negligent according to the ORP even though there was a 95% probability that 
the harm would not materialize. 
 31. Porat, supra note 1, at 246.
 32. Id. at 249-50. 
 33. Id.
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tort would have been fulfilled by choosing the less risky course of ac-
tion, one might argue that there is no factual causation between the 
negligent act and the first four risks but only the fifth one.34 But 
there is no certainty in this since there is a possibility of 90%, accord-
ing to the example, that the harm to the four fingers would not have 
happened had the less risky course of action been chosen. This is far 
from certainty or a preponderance of evidence.  
 Tort law today would justifiably hold the wrongdoer liable for the 
risks materialized to all five fingers. The compensation will not be 
reduced until it can be proven, at least by a preponderance of evi-
dence, that damage would have occurred to the four fingers had the 
nonnegligent choice been made. Porat demonstrates the ORP from 
probabilities which are under 50% and not beyond it. The ORP is 
built, due to its nature, on risks and not on certainties or probabili-
ties above 50% necessarily; therefore one cannot assume that there is 
some certainty in causing harm in the overlapping risks example. 
 Let me present another example. Suppose that to save a patient’s 
life it is necessary to remove one of his eyes, and the doctor saves the 
patient but negligently removes both of his eyes. It is clear in this ex-
ample that the doctor’s negligence derives from the fact that he also 
removed the healthy eye, an act that was unnecessary to save the pa-
tient. But a new principle of offsetting risks is not required to reach 
such an outcome. In this clear-cut example it is obvious that there is 
only a causal relationship between the negligent act and the addi-
tional harm it caused. This is actually offsetting pure harms and not 
risks, which is in accordance with principle number two presented in 
the introduction. Porat’s ORP, as demonstrated by his main example, 
does not relate to such cases, but only to cases where there are prob-
abilities, even low, of the occurrence of harm as a result of choosing 
the less risky, nonnegligent course of action. 
 Therefore, Porat’s argument that there are two causes of injury 
here: one that is not wrongful (which would have occurred anyway), 
with a magnitude of harm of $4000, and another that is wrongful, 
with a magnitude of harm of $1000, is unsounded. There is only one
cause of injury here, with a magnitude of harm of $5000. The prima 
facie harm of $4000 that might have been caused by the nonnegligent 
choice never actually materialized and might never have; in the main 
example there was only a probability of 10% that it would material-
ize. The harm caused by the negligent choice neither added to nor did 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See id. at 249 (citing Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An 
Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975) (explaining that the wrong-
doing must also satisfy the causal link condition: its recurrence must increase the chances 
that the injury will occur)).
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it occur simultaneously with another existing harm. In effect, the ac-
tual harm that was caused materialized independently. 
 Porat argues that the injurer must pay the injured party only 
$1000. However, if the magnitude of wrongful harm is only $1000, 
then why is there a need to compensate the victim for the additional 
$4000—through social or private insurance, as Porat proposes35—if 
this difference of $4000 does not stem from any wrongdoing? Does 
Porat only want us to notice that a person who is injured, but not 
from a tort, can purchase insurance and in this way be compensated 
for harms that are not covered in tort law; or maybe Porat also un-
derstands that the difference that was offset is actually a harm that 
needs to be compensated in tort law too?  
 People suffer various common injuries in their daily lives, injuries 
that do not originate in a tort, but in competition or other activities. 
In many cases there is no insurance or other factor to compensate 
them for such injuries, so they must bear it themselves. One must 
conclude that the entire $5000 is a wrongful harm and the injurer 
must pay full compensation for it. If the victim must be referred to 
private insurance to make up said difference of $4000, then this is 
not compensation for a wrong. A person may insure himself to his 
heart’s desire, pay the necessary insurance premiums, and receive 
compensation irrespective of the question of someone else’s negli-
gence. In any event, this rationale for the ORP is all the more prob-
lematic in the cases discussed further on in this Article where, ac-
cording to Porat, the negligent course of action avoided risks of 
harms to a third party or society at large and should also be offset.36
 Even the example that Porat gives from the field of obstetrics37
seems problematic for the purpose of establishing the ORP. If a doc-
tor negligently opts to perform a vaginal delivery resulting in harm 
to the baby, in Porat’s opinion, the risks from a cesarean delivery, 
which, in principle, entails higher risks than a natural delivery, 
should be offset, thus reducing the liability of the doctor who negli-
gently chose to perform a vaginal delivery. According to medical lit-
erature and statistics, the given risks of a cesarean delivery should 
not be considered at all. These are general risks that are always pre-
sent, and if it is found that the choice of a vaginal delivery was negli-
gent, then all of the harm should be placed on the doctor’s shoulders. 
The rationale is that the choice of a cesarean delivery, under the cir-
cumstances, would not be considered negligent even if it entailed a 
                                                                                                                    
 35. Id. at 270-71; Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 25.
 36. In fairness, Porat does not wholeheartedly recommend that the ORP be applied to 
offset such third-party risks but rather believes that, in accordance with the goal of optimal 
deterrence, this should be the outcome of the application of ORP.
 37. Porat, supra note 1, at 264-65.
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risk of harm—and even if this was a high risk in comparison to a 
normal vaginal delivery.38
 Let me present an example from another field, that of a construc-
tion engineer who has a choice of two possible materials for the pur-
pose of installing the floor/ceiling between two stories of a building: 
Material A, which is less stable, and Material B, which is more sta-
ble. Neither material is stable in an absolute sense (the assumption 
is that there is no 100% stable material that suits this work), and the 
use of either of them creates a potential risk; however, the assump-
tion is that only the choice to use the less stable material is negli-
gent, whereas the choice to use the more stable material is not negli-
gent. If the engineer acted negligently and ordered that Material A 
be used to build the floor/ceiling—which subsequently collapsed, 
causing a harm of $5000—it is inconceivable that he would be held 
liable for only $1000 because, had he acted nonnegligently, the poten-
tial harm would have only been $4000.  
 Admittedly, this is not a case of medical malpractice but rather of 
professional malpractice in a different field. While there may not be 
the same problem of overinvestment in precaution, it seems that 
there is no real difference between the two types of torts, and an at-
tempt to cope with the problem of defensive medicine does not justify 
such an outcome.39
                                                                                                                    
 38. In truth, if a doctor has chosen to perform a cesarean delivery instead of a vaginal 
delivery when there was no medical reason to do so, it is possible that his choice might be 
deemed negligent if it is a given that a cesarean section is riskier in general. The issue be-
comes more complicated as to the duties of a doctor in cases in which the woman insists on 
cesarean delivery for her comfort only, with no medical requirement for such a procedure, 
but that is beyond the scope of this Article. However, Porat’s example is of a doctor who has 
negligently chosen to perform a vaginal delivery instead of a cesarean delivery. In such a 
case, if under the circumstances there was a reason to perform a cesarean delivery, the in-
creased risks of such a delivery should not be taken into account. The risks are only greater 
in comparison to a normal vaginal delivery without complications and not in comparison to 
a vaginal delivery where an existing danger makes it necessary to perform a cesarean sec-
tion. In other words, if under the circumstances there was a need to deliver by cesarean 
section and not vaginally, it means that in this case the vaginal delivery was the risky 
course of action. If there is no increased risk under the circumstances then, in effect, there 
is nothing at all to offset. 
 39. Moreover, if the risks from the nonnegligent choice of action are offset against the 
risks from the negligent choice, then we may question why, according to the ORP, we 
should not also offset other existing background or environmental risks such as the risk of 
infection or the risks inherent to anesthesia faced by hospitalized patients. In the absence 
of medical malpractice, other common risks are also naturally present, including, for ex-
ample, the risk of being injured in an automobile accident or a domestic accident. And we 
can assume that the choice of a negligent course of action might prevent these common 
risks or decrease their likelihood to some extent.  
 Background risks are always present—daily life is replete with common risks that it 
is not proper to quantify and take into account. However, if the ORP purports to calculate 
the net liability of the injurer—to only isolate that part of the harm that he caused and 
that would not have been caused by other risk factors—then there is no presumable logic 
for failing to examine background risks that do not stem from the injurer’s acts or omis-
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 If it were possible to know in all of those cases with certainty, or at 
least by a preponderance of evidence, that the nonnegligent choice of 
the less risky course of action would cause harm, albeit reduced in 
comparison with the other course of action, then it might be said that 
a choice of the riskier course of action means that the injurer’s negli-
gence is only causally related to the difference between the two 
courses of action. However, that level of certainty is relatively un-
common in the real world, especially in the area of medical malprac-
tice, and these cases are actually about offsetting materialized 
harms, not risks. The ORP deals with cases of probabilities, even if 
low, that harm will be caused by a nonnegligent choice. It seems that 
here is where the innovation of his thesis lies. 
 As an interim conclusion, it seems that the application of Porat’s 
presentation of the ORP causes various practical problems. Porat 
warns us that, under the present situation, injurers bear a heavy 
burden for the damages caused by their negligence—in his words, ex-
cessive liability. From everything said up to this point, it is hard to 
be persuaded that the ORP is indeed the proper mechanism for de-
termining the so-called net liability of a wrongdoer. Therefore, it is 
also hard to be persuaded that the current situation, with all of  
its shortcomings, leads to a decrease or even to the avoidance of  
desirable social activity as Porat contends,40 which has yet to be 
proven empirically.41
 But even if there was a normative imperative for applying the 
ORP, it is difficult to implement in practice, as we have seen so far, 
for various reasons. Reality provides numerous examples in which 
the application of the principle is almost impossible. There is nothing 
                                                                                                                    
sions or from his negligent or nonnegligent choices. I certainly object to the notion of offset-
ting background risks. However, a proper analysis of the ORP might dictate such an out-
come. Yet, an outcome such as this seems inherently problematic and complicates the pos-
sibility to calculate offsetting risks. It is also unjust.  
 Nevertheless, we must admit that in many cases background risks will be present no 
matter which course of action is chosen, and, therefore, perhaps they offset each other. See
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537 (1972). 
Thus, the criticism brought in this Article is valid for cases where there are increased risks 
that are in fact related to the negligent choice of a particular course of action and not to the 
choice of a different course of action; for instance, the risk that a car will overturn, which is 
particularly high if the negligent course of action is in fact chosen. And in any event, the 
ORP is very problematic even without the added problem of background risks. 
 40. Porat, supra note 1, at 267-68 (discussing this extensively in regard to the practice 
of medicine as part of a contractual relationship between two parties in contrast to other 
noncontractual relationships where risks should still be offset and where the possible out-
come would be a decrease in or cessation of the activity).    
 41. This issue may be fundamentally problematic. Society does not want to create an 
incentive against involvement in activities such as medicine, but society does want negli-
gent doctors, particularly those who are serially negligent, to be discharged from the medi-
cal system. If damages caused by those doctors would be offset again and again, the liabili-
ty of negligent doctors would be reduced each time and there would be no incentive to dis-
charge them from the system.
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innovative about applying it to cases where it is obvious that harm 
would have been caused by the nonnegligent choice of the less risky 
approach and where the extent of harm is clear. However, there are 
often several different courses of action, and each one may entail the 
risk of a different harm—and possibly more than one harm of varying 
degrees (such as the side effects of a particular course of treatment, 
or even the possibility of disability or death)—and each harm may 
have a different probability of materializing. Under these circums-
tances, it is hard to demand such calculations—even in rough estima-
tion—from a potential injurer, a victim who wishes to sue, or a court 
that must adjudicate the case.  
 Porat notes that the offsetting risks are not determined by a calcu-
lation of the probability that the offset harm would have been 
avoided in the specific case in question, but rather by a calculation of 
the expected harms. 42 However, it is difficult in practice to estimate 
this difference for the purpose of offsetting risks, even when search-
ing for data regarding expected harm, particularly when there are 
several nonnegligent courses of action. 
 Porat also contends that excessive liability entails high litigation 
costs and increases the involvement of attorneys at the expense of 
patients, and the goal of the ORP is to overcome evidentiary barriers 
and lower such costs.43 Although, in fairness, he admits that the cal-
culations in offsetting the risks to reach a net liability are compli-
cated.44 But it seems the picture that emerges up to this point indi-
cates that it would be necessary to invest considerably more re-
sources in applying the principle: in the numerous calculations of the 
risks for each of several possible courses of action; in calculating the 
extent of damages for each of these courses of action; in calculating 
the probability of harm for each course of action; and, finally, in off-
setting the risks themselves. The principle’s application would ac-
tually create new evidentiary barriers since these added calculations 
would require the testimony of experts in the fields of both medicine 
and statistics. This would entail new expenditures added to the liti-
gation costs that already exist for proving the excessive liability 
about which Porat complains.  
 Some may argue that, since contingent fees are well accepted in 
many countries around the world, lower awards of compensation will 
also mean lower fees. However, even if this is basically true, it may 
be assumed that if the system were to adopt the offsetting risks mod-
el, lawyers would increase the percentage of their contingent fee so 
that it would be just as profitable for them to work on these types of 
                                                                                                                    
 42. Porat, Excessive Liability, supra note 1, at 26 n.33.
 43. Porat, supra note 1, at 264, 275.
 44. Id. at 272.
2009]              OFFSETTING RISKS IN TORT LAW 155 
cases in the future as it is for them today, especially when the issue 
entails handling more testimony, expert opinions, and so many calcu-
lations. Moreover, the work of the attorneys in suing an additional 
party other than the injurer—the social or private insurer—make the 
activity particularly lucrative because it would require greater effort 
on their part. More intense activities, like increased letters, more lit-
igation, preparation of cases against multiple parties, additional ex-
pert witnesses, etc., mean more working hours and greater expenses, 
which would be reflected in higher fees. 
IV.   THE PROBLEMATIC COMPARISON BETWEEN THE OFFSETTING 
RISKS PRINCIPLE AND PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION
 Porat argues that the ORP bears a superficial resemblance to 
what he refers to as a probabilistic recovery principle (PRP). PRP is 
the notion of probabilistic causation—which includes lost chance and 
increased risk doctrines.45 The ORP aspires to protect against overde-
terrence, i.e. from a situation where the wrongdoer pays more than 
the harm he created, whereas the PRP aspires to protect against  
underdeterrence, where a wrongdoer pays less than the harm that  
he created.  
 Porat attempts to draw inferences from this comparison in sup-
port of the ORP since, according to both principles, the injurer is held 
liable for the exact same magnitude of harm that he caused (in this 
case, the risks he created)—no more (ORP), and also no less (PRP). 
This is designed to provide the injurer with effective incentives for 
taking precautionary measures and minimizing social costs. The 
PRP, which is calculated ex post, aspires to overcome the uncertainty 
of a specific case, whereas the ORP, examining expected harms,  
aspires to grant credit to the injurer for the positive externalities of 
his activity.46
 A comparison between the principles may be done by calculating 
the attributable fraction, i.e., the portion of risk increased or chance 
lost by a wrongdoer’s act or omission. In both cases the calculations 
are complicated. There could be a serious problem in calculating the 
attributable fraction of the defendant’s act, in conjunction with the 
necessary calculations for the ORP, in an attempt to determine the 
effect of the defendant’s act on the plaintiff’s increased risk or lost 
chance. Apart from these calculation problems, one should be very 
careful when making a comparison of this nature. Indeed, Porat is 
consistent, and he attempts to convince us that the injurer should 
take responsibility only for the net risks that he caused.  
                                                                                                                    
 45. ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 116-29, 195-201
(2001).
 46. Porat, supra note 1, at 260-62.
156 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:137 
 This comparison also raises a number of problems. The PRP en-
ters the picture when we are talking about an incomplete tort where 
the factual causal relationship between the wrongful act and the 
harm has not been adequately proven. Therefore one may not accept 
PRP, and indeed there are countries in which PRP is not applied in 
case law, since it is considered as an incomplete tort. 
 All of this is in contrast to the cases presented by Porat as a basis 
for the ORP. In the basic example, the negligent choice, which entails 
a risk of $500, constitutes a tort. Once the harm of $5000 has been 
proven—presumably by a preponderance of the evidence—then all 
elements of the tort are present, including the factual causal rela-
tionship between the tortious act and the harm. Similarly, the non-
negligent choice in his example, which entails a risk of $400, is not a 
tort at all, even if were to result in harm of any magnitude. One 
should therefore be wary of the comparison between a principle that 
is applied in cases in which the tort is incomplete, but nevertheless 
partial compensation is awarded, and Porat’s principle which is to be 
applied in cases in which the tort is complete and the application of 
the principle leads to reduced compensation. 
 Moreover, the PRP, as it applies today, assists injured parties, 
whereas the ORP assists injurers. On the surface, this would indicate 
the neutrality of the economic approach to tort law, which serves as a 
basis for both these doctrines to be discussed—this approach does not 
consider the question of whether the outcome is beneficial to the in-
jurers or the injured parties, focusing instead on the issue of efficien-
cy alone. Of course there is not merely a technical difference between 
the issues. Indeed, it is certainly proper, in light of the goals of tort 
law, to examine the attempt to pay partial compensation based on 
the PRP according to lost chance or increased risk doctrines. This 
state is preferable for the injured party and from social and deter-
rence perspectives in comparison with a state of no compensation at 
all. But in applying these doctrines, an inverse outcome—of underde-
terrence—might be justified and accepted in principle, even to the 
point where the injurer would pay nothing, since this is an incom-
plete tort lacking factual causation. However, the underdeterrence 
resulting from the ORP’s partial compensation, or lack thereof, when 
all elements of the tort have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, is completely unacceptable.  
 Porat also notes that the PRP deals with the laws of evidence, 
whereas the ORP deals with substance.47 Therefore, the innovation of 
the ORP is greater, and although there is nothing wrong with inno-
vation per se, there are serious problems underlying the principle 
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and its application, as we have shown above, and it is also inconsis-
tent with most of the goals of tort law, as we will see below. 
 Nevertheless, even if there is some theoretical resemblance be-
tween the two principles, it is unclear that the proper outcome should 
actually be recognition of the ORP. To illustrate this, I will cite from 
a judgment in an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court in a case of a 
lost chance that dealt with a hospital’s attempt to reduce the award 
of compensation, awarded in first instance resulting from its negli-
gence, which had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The hospital argued, in a manner similar to the ORP, that probabilis-
tic causation must be symmetrical, leading to an outcome whereby, if 
there is a particular risk that an operation performed nonnegligently 
would also cause harm, compensation should be reduced by the same 
degree of risk, even when it has been proven that the harm was 
caused by a negligent act.  
 The hospital also argued that if the plaintiff could prove that it 
was negligent, but only by a probability of 70%, then the compensa-
tion awarded should only be 70% of the full harm inflicted, i.e. 30% of 
the compensation that was awarded in the first instance should be 
deducted. This outcome diverges from that of prevailing law, which 
awards full compensation when the preponderance of evidence bur-
den of proof is met, i.e., when negligence has been proven by a proba-
bility of over 50%. The court was adamant in its response, and its 
own words speak for themselves to our issue: 
The world of medicine is given to doubt and uncertainty. Every 
medical treatment might carry a certain degree of risk, even if 
administered properly. However, it is not accepted nor is it proper, 
when an operation has failed due to the negligence of the medical 
staff, to deduct from the amount of compensation a sum purporting 
to reflect said risk, even if this is an abstract or negligible risk.48
V.   THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE OFFSETTING RISKS PRINCIPLE WITH 
MOST OF THE GOALS OF TORT LAW
 Even if it were possible in some way to ignore all of the aforesaid 
obstacles presented by the ORP, including the serious, inherent prob-
lems in its application, there would still remain the grave problem of 
the incompatibility of the ORP and of the proposal to supplement the 
compensation through other mechanisms outside the scope of tort 
law, such as through social insurance and private insurance, with 
most of the goals of tort law. 
                                                                                                                    
 48. CA 7469/03 Shaarei Tzedek Med. Ctr. v. Cohen, Takdin Elyon [2005] IsrSC 
2005(2) 406 (translated by author).
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 Within today’s legal world, there is no consensus regarding the 
goals of tort law, or whether there is one or more controlling purpose 
in light of which cases should be analyzed.49 Some would argue that 
there is a mixture of goals underlying tort law but that not all of 
them can be applied in any given instance.50 Tort law developed pri-
marily under common law, which led to the development of ad hoc 
rulings from one case to another, and in ways that differed from one 
state to another.51 Today there is no overall agreement on what the 
goals are or on the scope of each goal. Various scholars present lists 
of these goals in slightly different ways. The following four principle 
goals have been presented: compensation and restitutio in integrum,
corrective justice, distributive justice, and, in part, deterrence.52
 The theoretical analysis of tort law over recent decades is marked 
by scholars who hold monistic approaches—that is, they see one or 
another of the goals of tort law as being dominant, almost to the ex-
clusion of the other goals. First, we find those who hold the deonto-
logical-ethical approach, supporting corrective justice. This approach 
examines the relationship between the injurer and injured party and 
the need to redress the injustice done by the former to the latter.53 On 
the other hand, there are those who hold to the consequential-
teleological approach—for our purposes, the economic approach—
whose primary interest is maximization of aggregate welfare and not 
necessarily the relationship between the parties. These scholars sup-
port optimal deterrence which looks at efficiency through considera-
tion of the outcome of the tortious act and attempts to minimize the 
expenses of the incident.54 In addition to these two approaches, there 
is another monistic approach, that of distributive justice, which em-
                                                                                                                    
49. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14 
(3d ed. 2007); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 1-7 
(5th ed. 1984); W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 1 (London, 16th ed. 2002);  
Glanville L. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137 (1951) 
reprinted in MARK LUNNEY & KEN OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT & MATERIALS 18 (3d ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2008).
50. ABRAHAM, supra note 49; WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 49; Williams, supra
note 49. 
51. ABRAHAM, supra note 49; Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory 
of Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 390-98 
(2005).
 52. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 49, at 20-26 (providing an extensive discus-
sion of the goals of tort law); see also Williams, supra note 49.
 53. The principle proponents of this approach in the past generation were George 
Fletcher, Richard Epstein, and, later, Ernest Weinrib and Jules Coleman. References will 
be provided below, where the goal of corrective justice is analyzed. 
 54. The principle proponents of this approach were Guido Calabresi and Richard 
Posner. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 23, 293-300 (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Accidents—A Legal and Economic Analysis, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 636 (1970) (Book Review); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law,
53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975). 
2009]              OFFSETTING RISKS IN TORT LAW 159 
phasizes the need to empower, through tort law, the weaker sectors 
in society; here feminism is particularly relevant.55
 In contrast to these approaches, a number of pluralistic approach-
es have developed which attempt to adjust two or more of the goals of 
tort law and find a balance between them. These approaches are dif-
ferent both in terms of the dominance that they give to a certain goal 
or set of goals from the outset and in the way in which they strike a 
balance between the different goals.56 These approaches do not limit 
themselves to simply analyzing one single goal of tort law, as the 
monistic approaches do. 
 This Article does not seek to present the monistic and pluralistic 
approaches in detail nor decide between them. The aim here is to ex-
amine the ORP against the familiar goals of tort law. The analysis 
below will show that the ORP impinges on each of these familiar 
goals. It will also raise the question of whether the ORP is absolutely 
consistent with the goal of optimal deterrence, which serves as the 
monistic basis for construction of the principle, although Porat does 
not ignore the other goals.57
 Essentially, the analysis below will indicate that the ORP is prob-
lematic with respect to each of the monistic approaches, particularly 
those of corrective justice and distributive justice, but also, to a cer-
tain extent, that of optimal deterrence. The principle is also proble-
matic according to the pluralistic approaches, whatever the balance 
between the individual goals may be, since the principle is proble-
matic in terms of each goal from a monistic perspective.  
 The problems in adapting the principle to the various goals of tort 
law are varied. They do not stem solely from the idea that the com-
pensation received under the ORP is partial, even though this is a 
very important point in analyzing the ORP vis-à-vis the goals of tort 
law. There are additional problems in the analysis of the various 
goals. Even though Porat claims that compensation under ORP is 
appropriate and in line with the goal of optimal deterrence (although 
not in line with the other goals, as he in all fairness acknowledges),58
the ORP may be attacked on the basis of this goal as well. 
                                                                                                                    
 55. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, in 
FOUNDATION OF TORT LAW 235-44 (Saul Levmore ed., 1994); Martha Chamallas, Importing 
Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 389 (1997). 
 56. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW (1993); Mark Geistfeld, 
Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law, PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
LAW OF TORTS 250 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Fleming James Jr., Tort Law in Mid-
stream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (1959); Robinette, supra
note 51; Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997); Williams, supra note 49. 
 57. See Porat, supra note 1, at 276 (discussing the goals of compensation and correc-
tive justice). 
 58. See id. at 247.
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 In the following discussion, I will try to show that the ORP is in-
compatible with most of the goals of tort law and also that the solu-
tions offered by Porat regarding supplemental compensation through 
other mechanisms outside of the boundaries of tort law could also be 
problematic in this context. 
 The ORP is most definitely inconsistent with the goals of compen-
sation and restitutio in integrum, whereby a person who suffers a tor-
tious harm should be fully compensated59 and, insofar as possible, 
restored to the position that they would have been in had the tortious 
act not been committed, whereas the compensation awarded by the 
application of the ORP is only partial.60 Nor is it compatible with the 
goal of corrective justice, which is to rectify a past injustice while tak-
ing into account the identity of the injurer and the victim and to ig-
nore all factors extraneous to the event.61 This incompatibility de-
rives from the basic fact that the compensation received from the in-
jurer is only partial. 
 In Porat’s opinion, the ORP might be consistent with principles of 
corrective justice since the payment by the wrongdoer is actually for 
the net harm that he has caused (i.e. the net risks that he created 
and where materialized) and no more.62 However, as stated in earlier 
Parts, it is hard to agree with this point of view. At any rate, even 
Porat admits that the partial compensation of the ORP will certainly 
be viewed as inconsistent with the goals of compensation and correc-
tive justice, since, in effect, application of the principle means that 
the victim will be undercompensated, which does not restore him to 
the position he would be in had the doctor acted reasonably instead  
of negligently.63
 Were it possible to reduce a known extent of harm that would 
have definitely, or at least on the preponderance of the evidence, 
been caused by the choice of a nonnegligent course of action, as in the 
                                                                                                                    
 59. ABRAHAM, supra note 49, at 14; Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 
HARV. L. REV. 234, 256 (1908), reprinted in FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF 
TORTS 530 (1926).
 60. PROSSER AND KEETON, ET. AL., supra note 49, at 20.
 61. See, e.g., ENGLARD, supra note 56, at 11-20; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 5, 56-83 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 
(1975); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Ste-
phen Perry, The Moral Foundation of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Christopher 
H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice & Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 
(1990); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992); Ernest J. Wei-
nrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 107 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of 
Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277 (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law,
23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA 
L. REV. 625 (1992).
 62. Porat, supra note 1, at 247.
 63. Id. at 247, 269; Cooter & Porat, supra note 1, at 25.
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previous example where both of a patient’s eyes were removed, there 
would be no problem of incompatibility with corrective justice. In 
such a case, it is clear that the factual causal relationship exists only 
in regard to the difference between the two courses of action, even 
without a need for the ORP. However, Porat’s thesis goes beyond 
this, and even he admits that it is problematic from the perspective of 
the goals of compensation and corrective justice. 
 It seems that Porat is uneasy about a situation where part of the 
damages falls on the victim’s shoulders. Therefore, he refers the vic-
tim to mechanisms outside the framework of tort law to supplement 
the difference, which could be substantial—such as in the example 
that he gives (80%). The two mechanisms proposed by Porat for the 
supplement of the compensation—social and private insurance—do 
not offer an adequate solution. But before analyzing these proposals 
against the goals of compensation and corrective justice, I wish to ask 
again: if the harm from the tort is only $1000, and the remainder 
does not derive from a tort, and presumably it would have been rea-
lized into a harm anyway by the choice of a nonnegligent course of 
action, then why compensate the victim for $4000 through a separate 
mechanism? The only possible conclusion is that the entire $5000 
represents a tortious harm that demands the payment of full com-
pensation by the wrongdoer. 
 Although the proposal to use a social insurance scheme to sup-
plement the difference has some logic,64 it has been rejected in the 
past for various reasons.65 Its application for the purpose of supple-
mental compensation after risks have been offset is even more prob-
lematic, both from a substantive as well as a procedural perspective. 
If the victim must be fully compensated for his injury, in accordance 
with the goal of compensation, and especially if he should receive it 
directly from the injurer, in accordance with the goal of corrective 
justice, then there is no logic in supplementing the compensation by 
means of private or social insurance.  
 The entire logic for establishing an insurance fund of this sort is to 
prevent medical malpractice cases from being submitted to the courts 
in the way they are submitted today and to offer the victim the option 
to file an insurance claim instead of directly suing the doctor. Even 
from a procedural perspective this would be cumbersome and would 
raise costs. It would also place an unreasonable and unfair burden on 
                                                                                                                    
 64. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW 
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 169 (1989); Porat, 
supra note 1, at 275.
 65. For a discussion of this proposal and its rejection in Israel, see MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING LIABILITY IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CASES (1999), headed by former Deputy President of the Tel Aviv District Court, Judge 
Gabriel Kling, § 97, at 101-02. For the dissenting opinion, see id. § 117, at 158-59.
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the shoulders of the patient who has been injured to file an initial 
application for insurance and a claim submission after the injury, 
and the financing of the fund would fall on the shoulders of all  
potential patients.  
 The proposal to set up a private insurance mechanism to supple-
ment the difference is also problematic as well as unjustified. Firstly, 
just as with social insurance, the victim would be forced to conduct 
separate proceedings against two parties, each for its own share. Se-
condly, the burden of applying for the insurance and paying for it 
would still fall on the shoulders of the potential injured party. Third-
ly, Porat notes, in fairness, that indigent patients may be disinclined 
to purchase private insurance (even if this is mandated by statute) 
because they cannot afford it. Those without private insurance could 
potentially pay a heavy price under Porat’s ORP if left uncompen-
sated for their injuries.66
 In any event, whether the arrangement involves social insurance 
or private insurance, the proceedings will be complicated. The in-
jured party will be forced to sue two separate defendants for each 
one’s individual share, and in both instances the burden of applying 
and paying for insurance will fall on the potential injured party.67
 In addition to the fact that the injurer does not pay full compensa-
tion, another problem with the ORP is uniquely related to corrective 
justice and not to the goal of compensation. According to the goal of 
compensation, there is no meaning to the identity of the compensa-
tor, as long as the injured party gets full compensation. According to 
principles of corrective justice, however, the wrongdoer, and only the 
wrongdoer, must fully pay for the harm that he has caused. The ORP 
dictates that the injurer pays only part of the damages, whereas oth-
er parties supplement the remainder. It is the injured party who pays 
the premiums and purchases the risk, rather than the injurer, and in 
many instances, such an injured party will not actually be insured 
and thus will not receive full compensation. In any event, if the  
injured party cannot afford to purchase insurance, he would be  
left with partial compensation only—a result that is contrary to  
both goals. 
 In addition to all this, Porat assumes that the patient’s ab initio 
interest is to be awarded partial compensation as a result of offset-
ting risks in order to improve the doctor’s incentive to provide better 
health care. In his opinion, imposing a duty on the doctor to pay full 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Porat, supra note 1, at 270 n.65.
 67. It is clear that no specific criticism is being raised here regarding the possible shift 
of the whole mechanism to social insurance or private insurance. These issues will need to 
be clarified separately. The point being raised here is simply a critique of the problem in-
herent in the existence of two different mechanisms and the complications as a result of 
proceedings in two separate claims.  
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compensation actually does the patient injustice.68 Porat explains 
that for patients the option of offsetting risks is a good option because 
the alternative means the continued practice of defensive medicine 
and an overinvestment in precautions, which is detrimental to the 
standard of health care they receive.  
 If this assumption were well-founded, then perhaps, on the bal-
ance between the various considerations, improving healthcare over-
rides the infringement of the goals of compensation and corrective 
justice. However, this is not so. It is difficult to say that the present 
situation, in which risks are not offset, is itself the cause of defensive 
medicine and overinvestment in precautions. This kind of argument 
requires a broader foundation.  
 Even if Porat’s solution would necessarily decrease the practice of 
defensive medicine and overinvestment in precautions, his specula-
tion regarding the interests of patients must be established and 
proven empirically. To the same extent, other assumptions may be 
made, including that the typical risk-averse patient would actually 
prefer to know that if he is caused harm as a result of medical mal-
practice he can sue and receive compensation for all of his damages, 
even if this requires that he pay a bit more from the start as a sort of 
insurance.69 He knows that even if there is no phenomenon of defen-
sive medicine, and medical services would be perfect, he may be 
harmed as a result of the doctor’s acts. Given this, he is not interest-
ed in suing the injurer and receiving only partial compensation de-
spite the fact that he has proven all of the elements of his claim, in 
order to create a general incentive for doctors to provide better care, 
even if it would have some positive effect on himself and on other pa-
tients in the future. A risk-averse patient would, therefore, want to 
ensure full compensation when he is harmed and not a partial com-
pensation in return for a general expectation of medical services that 
might affect him in the future.  
 However, even if we assume that the victim is willing to obtain 
partial compensation in exchange for better medical services, pa-
tients would certainly not want to have to conduct two separate pro-
ceedings against two different parties—the injurer and the social or 
                                                                                                                    
 68. Porat, supra note 1, at 269-70 (arguing that, in fact, this is less suitable in cases 
such as when there are benefits to third parties or to society at large). Porat agrees that 
the victim obviously has an ex ante interest in receiving the greatest amount of compensa-
tion possible, especially when there is no contractual relationship between the injurer and 
the victim. Id. Problematic cases, where risks to third parties or society at large are re-
duced from the compensation of a concrete victim, will be discussed below.
 69. Porat discusses this possibility but views it as part of the problem with the current 
reality in which risks are not offset. Id. at 269. Porat agrees that this is how a risk-averse 
patient would behave, but he views this as an anomaly. Id. at 269. In my opinion, it is hard 
to “fight” this reality; one should definitely not create an assumption that is contrary to 
this reality, even if the writer thinks it is an anomaly. 
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private insurance carrier—but would prefer to proceed against just 
one party: the party that inflicted the harm.  
 Indeed, Porat tries to handle the issue of what is desirable in the 
eyes of the typical patient. He is not satisfied with merely a general 
economic statement that the ORP is desirable according to optimal 
deterrence. Nevertheless, to support the assumption that people 
would behave in a certain manner, and not otherwise, as a basis for a 
proposal to effect a fundamental change in tort law, factors influen-
cing human behavior must be examined very carefully.70 It is not at 
all certain that patients would behave as Porat believes they would, 
or even that they could be persuaded to act in this way. It is more 
reasonable to assume that they would continue to behave in the tra-
ditional, risk-averse manner, interested first in knowing that they 
would be fully compensated if they need to sue. They would not want 
to have to go to the trouble of seeking supplemental compensation 
from another party in addition to the injurer, a burden that is incon-
sistent particularly with corrective justice. 
 Another problem with the ORP in regard to corrective justice is re-
lated to its central rationale, which is to deal with the problem of de-
fensive medicine and the subsequent overinvestment in precautions. 
This is a systemic and social reason, designed for the improvement of 
the system in general. This instrumental argument has nothing to do 
with the relationship between the two specific parties in a concrete 
instance of wrongdoing as dictated by corrective justice. If we do not 
adopt such extreme approaches as those which only focus on the 
plaintiff and the defendant—and allow certain considerations not di-
rectly related to the relationship between the two parties to be taken 
into account—we still need to carefully examine whether the problem 
of defensive medicine and overinvestment in precautions would be 
resolved by the proposed solution: a reduction in the compensation 
received by the victim who is then sent to seek the difference through 
mechanisms such as social or private insurance.  
 Porat notes that sometimes a negligent act committed against a 
specific person not only harms that person but also saves him from 
other risks. Under prevailing law, the wrongdoer receives no credit 
for the fact that he reduced the risk that would have been created 
                                                                                                                    
 70. See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 1-5 (1988) (criticizing 
economists who have not tried to examine the causes that affect human behavior); see also
Yaacov Schul & Ruth Mayo, Searching for Certainty in an Uncertain World: The Difficulty 
of Giving Up the Experiential for the Rational Mode of Thinking, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION 
MAKING 93, 93-106 (2003) (examining the questions of whether behavior can be directed, 
when people are more calculating, and when they are more experiential); Eldar Shafir & 
Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice,
24:4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449-74 (1992) (examining the rationales for human behavior in a 
manner different from the accepted view of economists, and attempting to advance a theory 
of expected utility). I thank Yuval Feldman for bringing this point to my attention.
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had he chosen the nonnegligent course of action; the positive external 
effect of his behavior is not taken into account.71
 However, from the perspective of corrective justice, the problem 
with offsetting risks related to the victim is only the tip of the ice-
berg. Porat also discusses the application of the ORP in two other 
categories extraneous to the specific victim—cases where the negli-
gent choice of a course of action has led to a decrease in risks to a 
third party or to a decrease in risks to society as a whole.72 Indeed, 
Porat does not propose to apply this in practice, but he points out 
that implementation of the ORP in such cases is just a consequence 
of its underlying rationale of using optimal deterrence to determine 
the net liability of the injurer. A fear exists that if the legislature or 
the courts were to adopt the principle in its entirety, they would also 
offset risks to a third party or a social interest, despite Porat’s  
objections. Again, this is radically inconsistent with the goal of  
corrective justice. 
 The third-party interest presented by Porat includes cases where 
the choice of a negligent course of action has not only endangered or 
actually harmed the victim himself, but has also reduced risks to a 
third party. In such cases, Porat argues application of the ORP would 
be consistent with the principle of optimal deterrence.73 He illu-
strates this with several examples. One example is that of a doctor in 
an emergency room who refrains from treating one patient so he can 
treat another patient, while the first patient sustains harm. Porat 
argues that the doctor should be given proper credit for reducing the 
risk to the other patient when compensation is awarded.74 However, 
this is a clear case of circumstance and there is no reason to examine 
the risks to each patient and offset them; instead, the focus should be 
on the negligence towards the patient who was not treated, and the 
court should be trusted to reach an outcome of reduced compensation, 
if appropriate, through common sense and nothing more.  
 This is possible since, for medical malpractice harms and other 
negligence damages, there are no fixed tables of compensation rates 
                                                                                                                    
 71. Porat, supra note 1, at 247-48, 252-53 (illustrating this not only with the first, ba-
sic example of medical malpractice—where the choice of the negligent course of action in-
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 74. Id. at 256.
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and the courts may award compensation as they see fit. For nonmo-
netary damages, one would trust that the courts would not award 
large sums of compensation in these types of cases. Furthermore, in 
certain circumstances the court should determine that there is no 
negligence at all without the need for a legislated ORP.75
 Another example is that of an ambulance driver who, while rush-
ing a wounded person to the hospital, negligently hits a pedestrian as 
a result of his speeding. According to Porat, the pedestrian is harmed 
by the driver’s negligence, but the risks to the wounded passenger 
are reduced because, if the driver had gone slower, the passenger’s 
condition might have worsened.76 Here too it may be said that in 
awarding compensation the court should be trusted to make the 
proper balance, without the need to legislate the ORP, since as stated 
previously, courts do not make their awards based on predetermined 
compensation tables in cases of negligence.  
 But even more than this, in such a case it may be argued that the 
negligent driver, despite his good intentions, which are not usually 
taken into consideration by the law of negligence, did not just in-
crease the risk of harm to the pedestrian by speeding and decrease 
the obvious risk to the wounded passenger of driving slower. He also 
increased other risks to the wounded passenger and all other passen-
gers who might have been further harmed as a direct result of the ac-
cident (a risk that was also increased for all drivers and pedestrians 
in the vicinity) or from a delay in reaching the hospital caused by the 
accident. In a case like this, principles of corrective justice might fo-
cus on the increased risk to the pedestrian. If risks to third parties 
should also be taken into account, then there is no logic in just consi-
dering the risks decreased by rushing the wounded passenger to the 
hospital while ignoring the increased risks that this behavior creates 
to third parties, i.e., the wounded passenger himself and all other 
drivers and pedestrians in the vicinity. 
 For example, if the risk for a wounded person were increased and 
decreased to the same extent, and it is agreed that increasing the 
risks to third parties should be considered and not only decreasing 
the risks, then there would be nothing to offset in the pedestrian’s 
lawsuit. This specific example also illustrates the possible complica-
tions and ramifications of applying the ORP, and not only its inap-
propriateness for corrective justice. In this example, there will be the 
need to calculate not only the risks to the injured party himself and 
offset them, but also the risks decreased to third parties and to offset 
                                                                                                                    
 75. It may be assumed that this would be the judgment in the example of the police-
man, given by Porat. See id. at 259.
 76. Id. at 254; see id. at 255-56 (providing examples of additional cases).
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them too, and then to offset what was left (if any) of the risks to a 
third party from the risks to the injured party.77
 One might also assume that, in the category of offsetting third-
party risks, the ORP would be applied in cases involving lawyers and 
their clients. A possible example is the case of an attorney who 
represents both the seller and the buyer in a real estate transaction, 
something that is accepted in various countries. In such a case, the 
risk of harm that is realized for one client could be offset against the 
risk of harm that might have been realized for the other client. In 
principle, the lawyer has an equal responsibility towards both par-
ties; however, in effect, he is performing a single transaction that has 
the potential of benefiting one party at the expense of the other. In a 
situation like this, an attorney handling such a transaction would 
know that if he is held liable for malpractice, he could always offset 
the risks if the loss for one party, caused by his negligence, also en-
tails a profit for the other party. Obviously, such an application of the 
ORP leads to an improper and unethical outcome. 
 Certainly, such an unethical and even immoral outcome would be 
inconsistent with corrective justice, apart from the ORP arrange-
ment’s overall unsuitability for this goal. This is a case in which it 
would be possible, as a kind of insurance, to control the possible prof-
it from any situation through offsetting risks, and thus to take less 
care, since harm to one party means profit to the other party. Such 
an outcome would serve the interests of the injurer in almost all cas-
es; it involves an unethical promise of offsetting, at the expense of the 
injured party. Undoubtedly, this is an instance of exploitation of the 
ORP. In many instances such exploitation may not be determined ex 
post; the lawyer may argue that, even if he was negligent, he was not 
so intentionally and did not consider these outcomes ex ante; as a re-
sult, he will now demand that the risks be offset.  
 If we adopt the common law distinction between intentional torts 
and unintentional negligent acts,78 this approach would involve a fur-
ther subdivision, separate from the distinction between negligence 
through the choice of a riskier course of action and other instances of 
negligence, to ensure a moral outcome. Apart from the application of 
the principle specifically to cases of medical malpractice, the prin-
ciple would be applied only in cases of unintentional torts. All this is 
                                                                                                                    
 77. This outcome joins the critiques that were noted in chapter II as to the problemat-
ic aspect of calculating the risks.
 78. In common law in general, there is a built-in division between negligent torts, 
which are considered unintentional, and torts as a result of reckless behavior, which are 
considered intentional. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 1, 2 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 85-117 (1881); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a 
General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 447 (1990). 
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in addition to Porat’s proposal to distinguish and not apply the ORP 
to cases in which the injurer artificially inflates the risks to be offset, 
thus deliberately lessening the difference between the forms of 
treatment, thereby lessening his liability as far as possible.  
 Apart from the problems with separating and calculating such a 
distinction, it is disturbing to think that, in cases in which it is not
possible to make such a distinction, injurers would succeed in their 
strategy and reduce the compensation to the injured party even fur-
ther. Here, even Porat would be forced to admit that, according to his 
approach, the compensation would be insufficient and clearly con-
trary to the goals of compensation and corrective justice.  
 In any event, there is another division here, even though, from the 
perspective of corrective justice, it may be appropriate to oppose the 
offsetting of risks in such instances—both that of the lawyer and that 
of the doctor who artificially inflate the risks to be offset. This is a 
kind of “catch-22”: if the ORP is not applied in the case of intentional 
behavior, there would be a further division between cases in which it 
is applied and those in which it is not applied. The laws of negligence 
would again be split in two, this time from another direction. If the 
principle is applied in cases of intentional behavior, it would involve 
a serious ethical infringement. 
 Even proponents of the economic approach who support optimal 
deterrence would agree that an upper moral boundary ought to be set 
that would not permit optimal outcomes that are highly immoral. 
Prominent scholars who are familiar with the economic analysis of 
law, among them one of its founding proponents—Professor Guido 
Calabresi—view considerations of justice and morality as something 
of a constraint when implementing an economic approach. Calabresi 
indeed notes that optimal deterrence is supported by considerations 
of justice,79 and it seems that Professor Gary Schwartz follows the 
same line of thinking.80 True, for Calabresi, only optimal deterrence 
is a legitimate goal, while justice constitutes a supreme moral boun-
dary as a constraint in the sense that if a particularly efficient out-
come is immoral in a given case, then it should not be sought even if 
it is extremely efficient.81
 This is even more true in regard to the societal interest cases pre-
sented by Porat. Porat explains that, when analyzing the goal of op-
timal deterrence, decreased risks to the aggregate social interest 
should be offset against increased risks that are realized for a specific 
                                                                                                                    
79. See CALABRESI, supra note 54, at 293-300; see also Guido Calabresi, Toward A 
Unified Theory of Torts, 1:3 J. TORT L.1, 1-2 (2007). 
80. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1824. 
81. CALABRESI, supra note 54, at 25-26, 31.
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victim of a negligent choice.82 He illustrates this with the example of 
a tour guide who has a choice between two paths: one where hikers 
are likely to be endangered and one where the hikers are likely to 
cause damage to the landscape. The assumption is that the guide al-
so has a responsibility to protect the environment, and not just to 
protect the safety of the hikers. The guide chooses the first path and 
one of the hikers falls from a cliff.83
 Applying the ORP to this case is extremely problematic. The 
choice of the path that is dangerous to the hikers exposes them to a 
risk to which they would not have been exposed on the other path. 
There is no reason to take into account the risk to the environment 
that was avoided by not choosing the safer path. The only risk that 
should be examined is the risk to the victims, in accordance with the 
goals of compensation and corrective justice. Preservation of life and 
limb ought to be viewed by the law as a supreme value, overriding 
environmental considerations.  
 The harm here is even greater than in the third-party interest 
cases. In the third-party interest cases, although they are still incon-
sistent with corrective justice because they involve a relationship ex-
ternal to the two parties, we are dealing with two instances of bodily 
harm occasioned to two different people, but in the societal interest 
cases we are dealing not only with a principle external to the rela-
tionship between the injurer and the injured party, but also bodily 
harm versus harm to flowers. Here too, Porat explains the outcome in 
terms of efficiency and optimal deterrence that sometimes, as he  
admits, are incompatible with corrective justice.84 But such an im-
moral outcome, where there is no proportionality in the offsetting 
comparison, must, even if optimal, be opposed by the proponents of 
economic analysis. 
 Offsetting of risks that apparently were saved to the injured party 
from the wrongdoer not choosing the course of action that entailed 
more risks for him (with all its problems), in addition to offsetting the 
risks that were saved for third parties and society in general (with its 
more severe problems), constitutes a real infringement of the goals of 
compensation and corrective justice. If that is the case, a proponent 
of an approach espousing the dominance of corrective justice—even if 
one does not take it literally—would not only find it very hard to ac-
cept an offsetting risks argument related to the victim himself, but 
also, and especially, one based on a concern for third parties or the 
aggregate social welfare at the expense of a specific victim.  
                                                                                                                    
 82. Porat, supra note 1, at 258-60.
 83. Id. at 258.
 84. Id. at 258, 268.
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 Even Porat does not necessarily recommend that risks to third 
parties and society at large be offset, but rather discusses this matter 
from the perspective of optimal deterrence and nothing more.85 But 
there is still the concern that if the ORP is ultimately adopted (and 
not limited on this point), it would possibly encourage, even if not de-
liberately, inappropriate and immoral actions. This only adds to the 
aforesaid inherent technical and substantial problems with the nor-
mal application of the ORP discussed above (which examines the 
risks for the injured party himself from both courses of action), in re-
lation to the goals of compensation and corrective justice. 
 Finally, let me examine whether the ORP is consistent with the 
unique approach of Professor George Fletcher in understanding cor-
rective justice. Although not adopted extensively in judicial rulings, 
this approach has often been mentioned in the literature dealing with 
corrective justice in particular, and tort law in general, over the dec-
ades since it was first presented. Fletcher offered a theory of reci-
procal risks as an appropriate understanding of corrective justice.86
Fletcher argues that the use of tort law to achieve social goals creates 
an inappropriate mix between corrective justice and distributive jus-
tice. He is opposed to instrumental conceptions of tort law, particu-
larly that of economic efficiency, and he sees the goal of this system 
as only the moral criterion of protecting the individual who has been 
harmed. He perceives corrective justice as derived from an examina-
tion of the risks that each party may cause to the other.  
 According to Fletcher’s approach, any liability regime has to ex-
amine the reciprocal risks that the parties create. If the risks are re-
ciprocal or relatively equal in magnitude, for example, two aircrafts 
that collide with each other, then the defendant would not be liable 
even if he caused the damage. If, however, the tortfeasor endangers 
the plaintiff in a one-sided manner, for example, a pilot who endan-
gers people on the ground, without a reciprocal risk equal or greater 
in magnitude than the initial risk, then liability for damage caused to 
the plaintiff would be imposed on the pilot.87 A nonreciprocal risk ex-
ists when, from the outset, the actions of the tortfeasor endangered 
the plaintiff more than the alternative choice of action or when the 
                                                                                                                    
 85. In spite of this, Porat mentions that offsetting risks in those cases also is an in-
evitable outcome in any case to ensure compensation that reflects the actual harm caused 
to the victim, while focusing on optimal deterrence and the net harm caused by the injur-
er’s actions. See id. at 256-60; but see id. at 276 (“[I]f, however, one accepts that principles 
of corrective justice and the goal of compensation should play a determinative role in  
tort law . . . then cases in which the offsetting risks relate to third parties or society  
at large could require different treatment. In such cases, application of the ORP is far  
more problematic.”).
 86. Fletcher, supra note 39, at 537-64. 
 87. Id. at 541-48. 
2009]              OFFSETTING RISKS IN TORT LAW 171 
risks are initially reciprocal but, as a result of the defendant’s negli-
gence, they became nonreciprocal.88
 The theory of reciprocal and nonreciprocal risks has to be applied 
separately in each case. In regard to medical malpractice, it is usual-
ly the doctor who endangers the patient, without any reciprocal risks, 
and certainly not risks of equal magnitude.89 Thus, the application of 
Fletcher’s approach does not fall outside the basic understanding of 
corrective justice as seen by the more traditional approaches—that 
when a nonreciprocal risk materializes to the patient, the doctor 
must pay full compensation to the patient. That being the case, it ap-
pears that the ORP is also inconsistent with Fletcher’s understand-
ing of corrective justice. This would be especially true where the risks 
being offset are to a third party or to society in general. Fletcher op-
poses looking beyond the two parties and the risks they create to-
ward one another. 
 Fletcher’s approach may indeed be closer to the understanding of 
distributive justice. One who endangers another with a nonreciprocal 
risk holds power and control. This applies to the division of power 
and wealth within society, and thus goes beyond the boundaries of 
the view of the two parties alone, perhaps contrary to Fletcher’s orig-
inal intentions and declarations, and is the underlying basis for the 
goal of distributive justice, which I will now discuss, and with which 
the ORP is also inconsistent. In any event, whether Fletcher’s ap-
proach is that of corrective justice or is closer to distributive justice, 
the ORP is not consistent with it.  
 To promote social goals, distributive justice links all potential 
partners in the allocation of wealth and other societal tasks, re-
sources, and benefits on the basis of the criterion of relativity.90 This 
Article has already criticized the two solutions offered by Porat for 
supplementing the offset compensation, based on their inherent in-
adequacy and their incompatibility with the goal of corrective justice. 
But they are also very problematic given principles of distributive 
justice, and the need to prove the separate share of each one. Accord-
ing to both solutions, someone other than the injurer, namely a social 
or private insurer, would supplement the compensation for the dif-
ference created by the offset risks.  
                                                                                                                    
 88. Id. at 547-48. 
 89. At times there is a risk that the doctor may be infected by the patient or that the 
patient or his family may attack the doctor. Such risks might be fixed in respect to each 
form of treatment chosen by the doctor, or they may vary to a certain extent in line with 
the form of treatment. But these risks are generally smaller than those arising from the 
doctor’s treatment of the patient. The latter generally constitutes a nonreciprocal risk for 
the patient by the doctor. 
 90. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 13-14 (2001).
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 Patients are traditionally viewed as a weak and vulnerable sector 
of the populace compared to doctors and the powerful institutions 
that support them—health services and hospitals. Of course, the in-
surers of these institutions have much more economic power than 
victims. Within the overall class of patients, those who have been 
harmed through medical malpractice are an even more vulnerable 
group, particularly when the total control over information relating 
to negligence and treatment is in the hands of the stronger parties—
the doctors and health services. Therefore, there is no reason to bur-
den this already vulnerable sector—which has suffered physical 
harm as a result of medical malpractice—with the need to purchase 
insurance and then seek compensation from two separate parties:  
injurers and insurers. According to distributive justice, it would 
make more sense to hold injurers, i.e., doctors and health services, 
fully liable.  
 The solution of private insurance is especially problematic from 
the perspective of distributive justice. Why not continue to impose 
full liability and compensation on the doctors’ insurance companies? 
It seems truly unfair even when we are talking about a patient who 
can afford to purchase insurance that would cover all of the damages, 
but especially when it concerns patients who cannot afford private 
insurance. This problematic consequence of the ORP is detrimental 
to all patients in general, and to indigent patients in particular. Why 
should we remove incentives that doctors—who are the stronger of 
the two parties—presently have to insure themselves fully for all of 
the harm they may cause a patient, regardless of the fact that some 
of this harm might have occurred with a certain level of probability 
had they chosen a nonnegligent course of action (let alone when the 
probability of this is low)? Is it not the doctor’s insurance company 
that currently pays, and not the doctor himself? Is there a justifica-
tion for shifting the burden to acquire private insurance from doctors 
to patients, to deal with the problem of defensive medicine by harm-
ing a weaker sector—and supposedly for its own benefit? 
 The present system is characterized by high insurance premiums, 
which reflect the internalization of the costs of precautionary meas-
ures and huge awards of compensation. It might be argued that the 
ORP would lead to a reduction in such premiums, and subsequently, 
the entire system would benefit because the problem of defensive 
medicine would fade away. Lower premiums for doctors do seem at-
tractive. However, if patients must purchase this supplemental, pri-
vate insurance, they will be forced to pay the premiums saved by doc-
tors. This is clearly inconsistent with distributive justice since the 
burden falls on the weaker party. It is even more disturbing given 
the knowledge that victims who cannot afford private insurance will 
not be fully compensated for their injuries. Therefore, the ORP en-
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courages the need for private insurance and would lead to a widening 
of social gaps, thus severely impinging on the principle of equality.91
 Ultimately, for the purpose of offsetting risks, concern for the in-
terests of third parties—especially the interests of strong parties like 
public authorities—can be inconsistent with principles of distributive 
justice.92 This is especially true when the outcome harms weaker par-
ties or even discriminates to a certain extent between them. Why?  
 As mentioned, operation of the ORP would create two different 
doctrines within negligence law and may affect, at least formally, the 
principle of equality, and not only in regard to supplementary com-
pensation from social or private insurance. In a case in which the 
ORP does not apply, where we are not dealing with a negligent choice 
of action B over action A, the injured party will receive full compen-
sation. In another case, where the OPR applies, he will receive par-
tial compensation. In both cases we are talking about the same vul-
nerable sector—medical patients—and the question of whether the 
outcome of a claim from that sector will be full or partial compensa-
tion will depend on the arbitrary, and somewhat cruel, choice by the 
medical team of one or another treatment. Some injured parties will 
remain without any compensation at all for the difference; some oth-
ers, who will supplement the compensation through social or person-
al insurance, will bear the economic burden of insuring themselves 
from the outset, as well as the burden of filing claims against two bo-
dies instead of against one. In any event, such a situation violates 
equality within that sector.  
 A further goal which some scholars see as independent and others 
see as belonging to distributive justice is loss distribution.93 Accord-
ing to this rationale, the damage should be distributed as far as poss-
ible between the various strata of society and should be removed 
from the shoulders of the direct injurer,94 so that the latter should not 
be overwhelmed by the burden of compensation, while the injured 
party ultimately receives the compensation to which he is entitled 
and is not left helpless. Therefore, the trend is to impose liability spe-
                                                                                                                    
 91. It is true that in the current reality, the cost of overinvestment in precautions is 
eventually passed on to the patient. But that would still be the situation after implement-
ing the ORP; only then, the solution would create a larger gap between patients, whereby 
only some would be able to afford private insurance to ensure full compensation for their 
injuries, while others would be left with partial—sometimes even negligible—
compensation. This is certainly not preferable to the current state of affairs.
 92. Porat, supra note 1, at 259 (admitting this to be true while still preferring the goal 
of optimal deterrence, with the understanding that application of the ORP reveals the net 
harm caused by the injurer).
 93. ENGLARD, supra note 56, at 55.  
 94. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 499 (1961); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Criti-
cal History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 
(1985). 
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cifically so as to distribute the damage over a large number of people, 
thus having each individual bear a small portion of the cost of resti-
tution or benefit without his economic or social situation being dra-
matically impaired. In this way, the whole of the damage does not 
fall solely on the injured party or on the injurer.  
 Here, the damage is distributed over the public as a whole, or over 
a group or sector relevant to that act. For example, service providers 
or manufacturers may factor the cost of the risk into a slight increase 
in the price of the product, and so distribute the damage over the 
consumer population—a kind of self-insurance through the popula-
tion of potential injured parties.95
 Another approach is to place the burden of the damage on who-
mever has deep pockets and can absorb the damage without affecting 
their social and economic status and can insure themselves. Thus, in-
surance companies are natural loss distributors, provided that insur-
ance arrangements are created in line with market forces.96
 Loss distribution may indeed be viewed as part of distributive jus-
tice since an equal and more appropriate distribution of resources in 
society depends on the ability of the parties taking part in an activity 
to absorb or distribute losses. In my view, this is the correct rationale 
since loss distribution is, in effect, a technique to apply distribution. 
Loss distribution to the deep pocket is indeed consistent with distri-
butive justice and perhaps even constitutes a part thereof; imposing 
liability on the deep pocket means transferring wealth from the 
stronger to the weaker side.  
 For our purposes, the ORP is ostensibly consistent with loss dis-
tribution. The distribution is carried out between the injurer and 
those who are vicariously responsible for him (doctors, HMOs, and 
hospitals) on one hand, and the social or private insurance, on the 
other. These two bodies constitute the deep pocket, and thus it is ap-
propriate to divide the compensation between them. Nevertheless, as 
noted, the distribution is not the same between these two bodies 
since the allocation to the second one—social or private insurance—
creates a significant cost and burden on the injured party. It is doubt-
ful whether the distribution achieves its goal, particularly when the 
weaker party, the one without deep pockets, bears the burdens that 
ultimately lead to distribution between two strong bodies, each of 
which has deep pockets, instead of the loss falling on the injurer; 
here too, the loss is distributed since the injurer has employers and 
insurers, and the loss is distributed between all of these through the 
purchase of insurance and the actual payment.  
                                                                                                                    
 95. CALABRESI, supra note 54, at 50-54. 
 96. Id. at 40-41. 
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 However, even if the pure interest of loss distribution exists abso-
lutely in the case of offsetting risks, it would be necessary (particu-
larly if this goal is associated with distributive justice) to impose the 
whole of the liability on these two bodies, the injurer (his principals 
and insurers) and the social or private insurer, jointly and severally, 
thus allowing the injured party to sue only one of them and requiring 
the defendant to seek indemnification from the other body. I also 
suggest that if a doctor, or any other injurer, wishes to benefit from 
the ORP, he (or his principals or insurers) must be obligated to pay 
the full sum of compensation, and only thereafter make a claim from 
the injured party’s insurer or the social insurance fund to obtain in-
demnification in the sum of the difference.  
 Having a single claim, in which the loss is divided jointly and sev-
erally, or from the outset moving the burden of payment of the full 
compensation sum to the doctor injurer, to his employers, or to his 
insurer, is only logical and fair. Why? The possible acceptance of the 
ORP makes the position of injurers better than the present situation. 
Hence, if this principle is legislated, such a mechanism could be used 
to provide relief to injured parties. Although this will not totally solve 
the fundamental problems set forth above, it will bring about a  
distribution of the loss in a way that is less of an imposition on  
injured parties.  
 Even an analysis of the ORP from the perspective of deterrence 
does not necessarily help the principle, both according to a traditional 
view of this goal, but also, to some extent, according to its economic 
aspect—efficiency.97 Implementation of the ORP is likely to contri-
bute to underdeterrence. A potential injurer should have an incentive 
to choose the less risky course of action, and the law should encour-
age people not to commit torts.98
 If potential injurers knew that even if they choose the riskier 
course of action—the improper and unreasonable course of action 
from a legal perspective, one that constitutes a tort of negligence—
they would not have to pay for all of the harm they caused, it might 
encourage them, ab initio, to choose the negligent course of action, or 
to artificially increase the risks that will be offset, or to carry out oth-
er manipulations to escape payment of full compensation.  
 This is particularly true when the risks offset lead to a relatively 
small difference between the overall harm actually caused and the 
                                                                                                                    
 97. Porat believes that the ORP is consistent with optimal deterrence as a derivative 
of the economic analysis of tort law and that the principle is basically a consequence of ap-
plying such an approach. Porat, supra note 1, at 247, 270, 275.
 98. People sometimes inflict harm in their daily lives, but if the harmful act is not tor-
tious, nothing wrong has been done from a legal perspective—for example, a person who 
opens a store next to a similar store operated by another person and thus harms the other 
storeowner’s livelihood. 
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benefit to the injurer from the negligent choice; for instance, a doctor 
who saves the expense of additional medical tests. A reasonable per-
son, who is not negligent, would not want to benefit from negligently 
choosing a riskier course of action when a less risky choice is availa-
ble. The underlying assumption of the ORP is that the wrongdoer has 
chosen a riskier course of action and is therefore negligent. If he does 
not pay for all of the harm that was sustained, there may be an in-
centive to act negligently in certain cases.  
 If one of the aims of the law is to foster values, then it must not 
encourage a potential injurer, not even indirectly, to choose a negli-
gent course of action, even if this choice is sometimes economically ef-
ficient, when there are nonnegligent courses of action available (even 
if these actions are also likely to cause harm). Furthermore, this en-
tire matter is often only viewed from an ex post perspective because a 
wrongdoer is not usually able to calculate and weigh all of the relevant 
data before acting, especially if several nonnegligent courses of action 
exist and each one carries a risk of harm at varying probabilities.  
 The firm response of the law to the wrongdoer who has negligently 
chosen a riskier course of action, when one or more courses of action 
which are less risky were also available, must be to impose liability 
for all of the resulting damages. This is not overdeterrence. This only 
means: Choose the proper course of action and you will pay nothing. 
Choose the improper course of action and you will be forced to pay for 
everything. This is the just expectation of every patient and potential 
victim and should be the expectation of society. 
 This is also true in cases that do not entail medical malpractice. 
Porat directs our attention to the negligent advice of a lawyer or in-
vestment consultant which creates increased risks, but at the same 
time avoids other risks.99 Would an enlightened society be willing to 
take into account avoided risks, the result of which would be to legi-
timize a tortious act? The attorney who represents both the seller 
and the buyer in a real estate transaction100 is a blatant example of 
this problem. Also consider the example given by Porat of the speed-
ing ambulance driver. Porat claims that the ORP would ensure that 
the driver internalizes, ab initio, the social risk that his behavior 
creates.101 It certainly could be an example of underdeterrence;102 if 
the driver were really to calculate and offset the risks, which would 
sometimes yield only a negligible difference, it might encourage him 
                                                                                                                    
 99. Id. at 252-53.
 100. Id. at 255-56.
 101. Id. at 254.
 102. This is said without going into the question of whether it is really possible to ex-
pect a driver in such a situation to calculate the risks of driving slowly as opposed to the 
risks of speeding and to offset those risks in order to decide whether it is worthwhile for 
him to drive one way or the other—or perhaps this is just a matter of hindsight.
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to behave negligently by speeding. Even if corrective justice was not 
the main goal taken into consideration, his action would endanger 
many other pedestrians and drivers, as well as his passengers. From
a social perspective, this would be undesirable. The courts can be 
trusted to reach a balanced outcome in such cases, as they have done 
up to now. 
 Moreover, Porat discusses the trouble with prevailing law, in that 
it might encourage the potential injurer to overinvest in precautions 
due to his anticipation of liability for high damages.103 In my opinion, 
these are the exact damages that he has caused; therefore the impo-
sition of liability for the entire harm is fully justified. There is also a 
fear that injurers would become too obsessed with calculating wheth-
er or not they have more to lose than to gain. If injurers were to per-
form an ex ante calculation of offsetting risks, then there is a concern 
that this would constitute an incentive to behave negligently when it 
is worthwhile for them. Even if they would not make such a calcula-
tion in each and every case, there is a tangible fear of a negative in-
centive to act nonnegligently. Under ORP, potential injurers would 
know that, even if they are sued for their negligence, they could al-
ways try to argue that other nonnegligent courses of action would 
have produced a risk of harm, and that this risk must be offset. Al-
ternatively, they could artificially increase the expected risks to be 
offset. A situation like this also leads to underdeterrence and to a re-
versal of the defensive medicine phenomenon. Therefore, this out-
come is also undesirable, even more so than the continued practice of 
defensive medicine. 
 Now consider optimal deterrence. It is doubtful that preventing a 
risk which did not materialize is significant enough to constitute an 
additional benefit. Sometimes the probability of the risk even mate-
rializing is very low, and in these cases it is even less clear that pre-
venting the small risk is an additional benefit.  
 Porat’s starting point is that risks are taken into account as posi-
tive externalities, as a realization of the first principle presented in 
the introduction to this Article (the “incomplete tort”). Thus, he is 
trying to change the customary legal situation today. The question is 
whether this is sufficient to provide an overall increase in aggregated 
social welfare. One might say that prevention of a risk that did not 
materialize does not increase the aggregate social welfare, particular-
ly when the alternative was that another risk could materialize 
(which did actually materialize). That being the case, the assumption 
of efficiency underlying the ORP appears shaky. In this I would agree 
with Professor John Goldberg and Professor Benjamin Zipursky, who 
posit that duty of care does not require the prevention of risks, only 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Porat, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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of harm.104 As long as the risk has not materialized, it cannot be seen 
as harm. And as long as it is not seen as harm, its prevention cannot 
be viewed as additional welfare.  
 In our case, the doctor’s choice of treatment exposed the patient to 
increased risk. At the moment this risk materialized and harm was 
resulted, we recognize grounds for the patient to sue. It is only then 
that the patient becomes the “injured party.” But if the risk had nev-
er materialized, we would never have given the patient the opportu-
nity of suing for this harm (again, the first principle in the introduc-
tion to this Article). Unrealized risk should not be offset.105 Further-
more, those who believe that an immaterialized risk can increase so-
cial welfare must then determine the rate as a percentage for that 
probability that did not materialize and must not ignore small rates 
of risk. How does this apply? If, from the outset, the chance of the 
risk materializing and harm being done is low (even if not negligible), 
say 10%, there is a rather feeble chance that the prevented risk 
would have even materialized. Therefore its ultimate prevention by 
the choice of another option, where risk materialized, is insignificant 
and should not be taken into account.  
 Although a risk was indeed prevented, the chance that this risk 
would, from the outset, have materialized was so small it should not 
be offset. In other words, even if we accept the problematic point of 
view under which offsetting the risk prevented by choosing another 
option is viewed as part of increasing the aggregate welfare and is 
thus an expression of efficiency, then when the chance of that risk be-
ing materialized is small, even as a part of a relatively large scale of 
damage—for example, 10% of damages totaling millions of dollars—
the concept underlying the ORP is problematic.  
 Even if this were to be the only problem underlying the ORP, it is 
a weighty one since then it might be justifiable to offset more signifi-
cant risks, like those greater than 50%. In this situation, ignoring the 
other serious problems regarding offsetting risks, the ORP might be 
accepted specifically for those instances in which the risk prevented 
from the outset was significant in terms of the risk of its materializa-
                                                                                                                    
104. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1652 (2002) (“[T]he duty of care owed in most instances of actionable negligence is a 
duty to take care to avoid causing an ultimate harm, such as physical injury or property 
damage, not a duty to take care to avoid causing the intermediate harm of heightened risk. 
It is a duty to take care not to injure, rather than a duty to take care not to engage in inju-
rious conduct that is conduct that risks causing an ultimate injury.”). 
105. This point of view may be challenged by saying that it may be that the risk in the 
treatment not chosen would not have materialized had that treatment been chosen. That 
is, that no harm would have occurred, and the risk materialized specifically due to the 
choice of treatment, and so the choice of the other treatment, which was not chosen, would 
ultimately have increased the patient's welfare. But the opposite may be equally argued, 
and so this argument is not significant. 
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tion. But then negligence laws would again be split into two classes, 
under one of which we accept the ORP only when the alternative op-
tion had a significant chance of materializing the risk. And as we 
have seen, applying the ORP even in cases where the chance of the 
risk in the nonchosen option materializing is significantly large 
presents problems of various types with its application, even in this  
limited situation. 
 In addition to all of that, the presumption that reducing compen-
sation would decrease the phenomenon of defensive medicine and 
lead to greater social welfare requires further examination. Porat 
contends that a reduction in compensation awards would lead to a 
decrease in the phenomenon of defensive medicine.106 This was the 
primary motivation for establishing the ORP. However, it seems that 
there is no research concluding unequivocally that this phenomenon 
is necessarily negative. It may have positive consequences regarding 
deterrence, even in comparison with the opposite situation where, out 
of exaggerated self-confidence and underdeterrence, patients would 
not consent to proper medical examinations and illnesses would not 
be discovered in time. It may be that defensive medicine increases 
aggregate social welfare by helping patients prevent risks and ad-
vance overall confidence, or at least does not decrease the quality of 
medical care, even if in certain cases patients are being exposed to 
unnecessary and even harmful examinations.107 Therefore, research 
                                                                                                                    
 106. Porat, supra note 1, at 246, 264-66.
 107. Indeed, it may be necessary to consider the problem of defensive medicine itself: 
the question of whether such a problem exists and whether all of its ramifications—
increased litigation, the rise in the sums awarded as compensation, and the increased cost 
of medical services—are necessarily problematic, or only problematic. See, e.g., TOM BAKER,
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 121 (2005) (“[T]he survey research does confirm that 
doctors believe that malpractice liability affects how they practice medicine. The most 
common effects that they mention are maintaining more detailed patient records, spending 
more time with patients, referring more cases to specialists for consultation, increasing the 
number of diagnostic tests, and, in earlier surveys, increasing their fees. Whether these ef-
fects are good, bad, or indifferent is impossible to tell from a survey. . . . [I]t seems quite 
likely that a substantial portion of this defensive medicine in fact is beneficial. But my 
judgments about this are pure speculation . . . .”); id. at 118-19 (“[M]easuring the extent of 
defensive medicine requires distinguishing between the good, injury-prevention effects of 
malpractice lawsuits and the bad, wasteful effects.”); id. at 119-20 (“The public and most 
doctors understand the term ‘defensive medicine’ to refer to something that is always and 
everywhere bad. Yet researchers define the term to include an indefinable but undoubtedly 
large proportion of activities that benefit patients.”); Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: De-
terring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 
1371 (2003) (“While defensive medicine may, in some instances, provide a positive contri-
bution to patient care by increasing the likelihood of early detection of a disease or condi-
tion, it often results in physicians ordering a great many unnecessary diagnostic tests for 
legal rather than medical purposes.”); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of 
Health Care Quality in the United States: Is Malpractice Part of the Problem or Part of the 
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 991 (2005) (“Liability apparently makes a modest posi-
tive contribution to patient safety overall, accounts for significant improvements in anes-
thesia safety, encourages providers to solve specific problems at specific health care insti-
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is needed to substantiate the conclusions that actually led to the cre-
ation of the ORP.108
However, even if defensive medicine is a negative phenomenon 
that has no positive or redeeming features and should be eliminated, 
there still exists another difficult problem of fulfilling the goal of op-
timal deterrence. As noted above, the ORP is not consistent with ei-
ther corrective justice or the goal of compensation because it provides 
only partial compensation. However, even if we were to accept the 
assumption that the compensation provided is full as opposed to the 
excessive liability under the present compensation regime, as Porat 
argues, it seems that it is problematic to argue honestly that the ORP 
is consistent with optimal deterrence. Indeed, it may be that the 
ORP, even if fully justified, is not optimal and goes beyond what is 
necessary and thus does not promote efficiency, but rather underde-
terrence and unnecessary harm to the injured party. 
 The prevailing reality is that many victims of medical malpractice 
do not even sue for their damages—which is evidence of underen-
forcement.109 This is for a variety of reasons, such as the difficulty of 
proving the case or the cost of filing suit; thus there is underdeter-
rence instead of optimal deterrence.110 Recent data indicates that, in 
regard to relatively low sums, only 8% of all victims of medical mal-
practice in the United States are awarded any compensation—only 
                                                                                                                    
tutions, and causes physicians to be more forthcoming in conversations with patients.”); id.
at 917 (“[N]o study has shown that exposure to liability has a statistically significant nega-
tive effect on the frequency of error reports. No study has shown that liability exposure 
causes health care quality to decline overall. Instead, the best available evidence shows 
that liability makes a modest positive contribution to patient safety despite the definitive 
and unqualified claims to the contrary made by patient safety advocates and other critics 
of the tort system.”); Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Congress, Defensive Medicine and 
Medical Malpractice 74 (1994), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1994/ 
9405_n (“[A]lthough direct physician surveys suggest that fear of malpractice liability is 
widespread among physicians and that many of them practice defensive medicine, the va-
lidity of these results is highly questionable for a number of reasons—in particular, the 
“prompting” of physicians to cite malpractice liability concerns and response bias due to 
low response rates. Consequently, the results of many of these surveys probably considerably 
overestimate the extent of defensive medicine.”) (emphasis added).
 108. Note—I am not arguing that defensive medicine is something good or beneficial 
for society in general. This is only an attempt to assess whether defensive medicine also 
has advantages, that is, whether the care taken by doctors, even if excessive, nevertheless 
leads to a reduction in errors and greater adherence to procedures, alongside the obvious 
shortcomings of this phenomenon. It is, however, an attempt to contradict Porat’s unequi-
vocal assumption and say that perhaps we need to be less unyielding regarding the as-
sumption of the discussion since defensive medicine may possibly bring about an increase 
in social welfare, even if other aspects of it tend in the other direction. We need to examine 
what the sum total outcome is from those increases and decreases in social welfare (should 
it be possible to assess this). 
 109. Porat, supra note 1, at 271; see also BAKER, supra note 107, at 22-44, 63; David A. 
Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 628-30 (2001).
 110. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Gov-
ernment Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1295-97 (1980).
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40% of the 20% who decide to sue.111 Other research carried out from 
the 1970s to the 1990s indicates that only one person in twenty-five 
harmed by medical negligence ever files suit.112 This is underen-
forcement, which leads to underdeterrence, and, as Tom Baker writes 
regarding these data, “this fact alone would tell us that the price that 
doctors and hospitals are paying is much less than the cost of the 
medical injuries that they cause.”113
 Under these circumstances, even a certain degree of overcompen-
sation by defendants in medical malpractice cases (excessive liability 
in Porat’s view) would still lead wrongdoers to likely pay less than 
the average damages they cause.  
 Such low percentages of claims filed and compensation for medical 
malpractice may even indicate that there is a natural offsetting of 
risks. In most instances, people are not compensated for the harm 
done to them through medical negligence and, of those who do receive 
some compensation, many are not fully compensated. This would 
seem to strongly indicate that even this natural offsetting is insuffi-
cient and that ultimately the present situation, without the ORP, 
does not involve structural excessive liability, but rather diminished 
liability, or certainly no more liability than the average level of harm 
caused, thus providing effective and optimal deterrence. Hence it is 
inappropriate to reduce liability still further through application of 
the ORP since, based on this analysis, it could lead to underdeter-
rence that reduces aggregate social welfare.  
In the eyes of corrective justice, which examines only the relations 
between the injurer and the injured, this is problematic because the 
natural offset means there are three types of patient-plaintiffs: one 
type sues and receives either reduced compensation or nothing; the 
second type receives the proper damages; and the third type may 
possibly receive more than deserved. Thus, compensation for harms 
appears to average out and, all in all, covers the overall damages, or 
perhaps even less. Nevertheless, optimal deterrence focuses on the 
acts of the wrongdoer; hence this natural offset may be compatible 
with that goal. Therefore, there is no need to legislate the ORP and 
                                                                                                                    
 111. Robinette, supra note 51, at 406-09. Nevertheless, it is hard to learn from such da-
ta since many lawsuits conclude with a judicial determination that there was no negligence 
and, therefore, no compensation is awarded, while in other cases insurance companies pay 
settlements when the nuisance value makes it more worthwhile for them.
112. Tom Baker’s book surveys various researchers that all come to this amazing con-
clusion (most talk of 3%, or at most 4%), among them research from California from the 
mid-1970s, research carried out at Harvard in the mid-1980s, two additional researches 
carried out at Harvard in the mid-1990s, and research carried out in Chicago, also in the 
mid-1990s. BAKER, supra note 107, at 25, 27, 63, 69. 
 113. Id. at 63. 
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reduce the risk more than the natural reductions present in the  
current system.114
Porat responds that it is difficult to quantify and evaluate the de-
gree of enforcement in medical malpractice cases.115 But as stated, 
data already exists on this subject. Porat also claims that “there is no 
reason to assume that the presence of offsetting risks is a good proxy 
for underenforcement that can be cured by ignoring offsetting risks 
altogether.”116 But even if this is true, it would seem that data on 
such undercompensation for medical malpractice actually proves that 
overenforcement, insofar as it exists, does not even approach the 
tremendous levels of underenforcement. In my opinion, this is not re-
ally overenforcement but rather the proper degree of enforcement.117
That being the case, there is no place to further reduce the magni-
tude of liability by the ORP. It is the existing situation, of natural 
risk offsetting, that is closer to optimum, rather than a structural off-
setting of risks. 
 Furthermore, it is possible that applying the ORP might lead to a 
phenomenon that is the reverse of defensive medicine. Victims would 
believe that their chances of prevailing in medical malpractice cases 
are so slim that they conclude it is not worthwhile for them to file a 
lawsuit. This might be due to a potential plaintiff knowing that, even 
if he can prove a complete tort by a preponderance of the evidence, he 
would have to contend with arguments by the defense regarding oth-
er possible, nonnegligent courses of action that might have also re-
sulted in harm. This would create an additional negative incentive 
for victims to sue, even in cases where it is clear that a wrong has 
been committed and harm can be proven.  
 An even more dramatic decrease in the number of medical mal-
practice lawsuits due to this fear of lack of feasibility, even in the 
most justified cases, would radically shift the pendulum in the oppo-
site direction and would be a clear manifestation of underdeterrence. 
Furthermore, if the ORP were to be extended to cases other than 
medical malpractice, and risks to third parties and to society in gen-
eral would be offset, then the incentive to file tort lawsuits might be 
reduced even more, thus causing even more overall underdeterrence. 
                                                                                                                    
 114. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1126-27 (1972); Fischer, 
supra note 109, at 628-30; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 888-89 (1998).
 115. Porat, supra note 1, at 271.
 116. Id. at 272.
117. In addition, this argument by Porat is unconvincing in light of the fact that, as 
discussed above in dealing with corrective justice, he reduces the benefit in one area to in-
crease it in another—even though there is no real connection between the two—by offset-
ting risks avoided by third parties and society at large against risks actually realized by a 
specific victim, based on considerations of optimal deterrence.  
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 However, even if defensive medicine were a negative phenomenon, 
that had no positive or redeeming features, or whose disadvantages 
exceeded its advantages, ORP would probably not solve, or even les-
sen, the problem. 
 Defensive medicine does not stem only from the level of compensa-
tion since the doctor pays nothing out of his own pocket; it is his in-
surer that pays. One may assume that the most important thing from 
the doctor’s perspective is to avoid being held liable. There are many 
reasons for this, primarily: the fear of harm to his reputation; the 
fear of a disciplinary hearing; and even, in cases of wrongful death, 
the fear of criminal indictment. Therefore, a doctor will make every 
effort not to be held liable. The amount of damages awarded is not 
always very relevant to defensive medicine since doctors pay nothing 
out of pocket.118 There may be instances where, from the doctor’s 
perspective, it makes no difference if his liability is found to be $1000 
or $5000—what matters to the doctor is that he has been held liable 
and found negligent.  
 The amount of compensation is naturally relevant to the insur-
ance company and, to a certain degree, medical services and hospit-
als that have vicarious liability over the doctors as well due to the 
cost of premiums they pay to the insurance companies. Although 
there are doctors who insure themselves, in many cases doctors are 
insured by HMOs and hospitals, and the only thing they have to be 
concerned about is a finding that they have been negligent. At the 
same time, in many instances the premiums are so high that many 
doctors are reluctant to specialize in certain fields;119 it is the number 
of suits and not just their outcomes that influences premium levels as 
a result of the high costs of litigation. 
 The absence of precise data for the offsetting risks formula is 
another problem. As we have seen, the ORP requires complicated cal-
culations. As a possible answer to arguments addressing the need for 
additional information and calculations that would complicate mat-
ters and make litigation more costly, Porat argues that the courts do 
not really need to perform precise calculations and place real num-
bers in the formula to apply the ORP.120 He does not expect courts to 
actually act according to the formula since they would often face dif-
ficulty in calculating the expected harms. Instead he contends that 
                                                                                                                    
 118. It may be assumed that a doctor with insurance coverage, whether a young doctor 
just starting out, or a senior physician with an established reputation, would prefer to pay 
more or have his insurer pay more as part of a compromised arrangement, without admit-
ting fault, rather than lose his reputation. Hence, doctors may certainly push toward such 
arrangements, even if this increases their insurance premiums later. 
 119. See, e.g., Chandler Gregg, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No An-
swer?, 70 MO. L. REV. 307 (2005). 
 120. Porat, supra note 1, at 251-52, 272-73 (explaining the formula Porat presents).
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the legislature should give the court a “menu” of options from which 
it would choose the correct formula for compensation under given cir-
cumstances, therefore making it unnecessary for the court to make 
precise calculations of expected harms.121 He suggests that the legis-
lator can rule that in certain cases full compensation would be given, 
or two-thirds, one-half, etc. 
 However, even if the courts would not place precise numbers in 
the formula, there would at least be a need for rough estimations for 
the application of the ORP. Assuming that people are calculating or 
prudent, or that they might be offered incentives to be calculated or 
prudent, an assumption that lies at the basis of the economic ap-
proach, potential injurers who want to determine whether their ac-
tivity would be considered negligent and whether or not they would 
benefit from offsetting risks—and, if so, to what degree they may 
benefit—would want to do it in advance, even if only as a rough  
estimation, for the sake of their defense at trial. Victims who wish to 
sue would want to do it as well, and so would courts adjudicating 
such cases.  
 Thus the ORP impairs legal certainty and stability because the 
risks cannot be calculated and offset in advance. The moment a legal 
principle rests on a mathematical calculation, by definition, it must 
at least be proven approximately. It seems that the ORP, as pre-
sented by Porat, does not even allow for rough estimation of the off-
setting risks and, without quantifiable data, the formula has a slim 
application. One cannot be satisfied with the general declaration that 
there is a certain risk in the alternative course of action that was not 
chosen and therefore courts should offset some risk from the risk that 
materialized. This is too fluid. 
 The ORP does not deal with the question of whether or not to im-
pose liability (since it is already given that the wrongdoer had chosen 
negligently the riskier course of action), but rather which acts should 
or should not cause liability, a matter that affects the degree of the 
compensation that should be imposed. Therefore, without precise—or 
at least approximate—data, it is not possible to offset one risk from 
another and arrive at a given amount of compensation. But, as al-
ready noted, it appears that even approximate data will not be avail-
able since it is impossible to prove that the risk of a course of action 
not chosen would actually be realized for a specific victim. Every per-
son might react differently to the same medical treatment. Some will 
be harmed and some will not, and there will be no true indication  
as to whether the victim would have been harmed by the use of a  
different treatment. 
                                                                                                                    
 121. Id. at 273.
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 A possible response to this is Porat’s proposal—to divide negli-
gence law into different classes of cases and, for each, have the legis-
lature determine what percentage, if any, the courts are to deduct. 
This proposal is not just arbitrary. It presents a general, approximate 
formula for offsetting risks, a formula which may well be ineffective. 
If we accept the assumption that an exact, or even approximate, off-
setting of risks leads to exact and not heavy or excessive liability, 
such liability fixed in advance in tables of percentages would certain-
ly not be exact enough to reach a so-called net liability. It would be 
greater or less, depending on the circumstances, and may undermine 
the purpose of the ORP as presented.  
 Moreover, such a determination ab initio is contrary to rectifying 
the harm exactly, as required by corrective justice. The ORP requires 
making a general formula available to each and every citizen, some-
thing that Porat himself solves by having it established in law. How-
ever, the question is whether the legislature would be willing to take 
such a step and predetermine various forms of compensation in line 
with offsetting risks for each group of cases in negligence law. Per-
haps apart from all these problems there is the concern that such leg-
islation would create a further subdivision within negligence law 
created as a direct result of applying the ORP.  
But even if approximate data could be placed in the formula in 
each individual case, its use is still problematic. One might question 
whether a person, especially a private individual acting spontaneous-
ly, calculates risks and acts rationally—and not instinctively—in 
considering this calculation.122 For example, in a fault-based liability 
regime, a person who drives faster than allowed or does not obey a 
traffic sign and thus gains time would find it difficult to calculate 
whether it was really worthwhile for him in terms of increased prob-
ability of a road accident versus the choice of a less risky course of ac-
tion. In the same way, a pedestrian who takes a shortcut, and thus 
trespasses and damages flowers in a person’s garden, does not calcu-
late precisely, or even approximately, the precautions versus the ex-
pected harm of both alternatives. Therefore he does not offset, even 
in a rough estimation, the risks to find his so-called net liability. It is 
even harder to say that, in a fight between two people, each of them 
actually calculates his gains from hitting the other. The same is also 
true with nuisances between neighbors, domestic violence, and other 
common tortious acts since many of them are derived from emotion. 
                                                                                                                    
 122. This is different from a large commercial economic body that usually employs a 
risk management function. It may be that a doctor, as a professional, would be a bit more 
prudent than the average private wrongdoer, although this question itself should be ex-
amined too. 
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 Hence the question arises not only whether the calculation of the 
ORP is feasible, but whether there is some reasonable expectation 
that potential injurers, particularly private individuals—who tend to 
be spontaneous and not overly calculated—would make use of this 
and really plan their actions so as to reduce the number of accidents 
and their costs and increase the aggregate welfare. The economic 
perspective would answer in the affirmative. A person or organiza-
tion ought to be calculating. If not, then the incentive inherent in op-
timal deterrence is supposed to make him so. If deterrence does not 
work, and he causes harm, he ought to pay.  
 Other monistic perspectives would offer different responses, and 
the various pluralistic approaches would respond differently depend-
ing on the relative dominance of optimal deterrence within each plu-
ralistic approach. The possibility of incorporating numbers in the 
ORP formula is rather limited, perhaps almost nonexistent, for po-
tential individual injurers who are spontaneous and imprudent. It is 
likely more relevant to large organizations which calculate risks and 
manage them. Thus, this possibility is problematic and may lead to a 
further division within negligence law: between those for which data 
might be provided or for which a conceptual framework might be of-
fered, as Porat intends, and those for which this would be impossible. 
 This last critique is more akin to a criticism of the applicability of 
the formula than of the ideas underlying the ORP. Even so, it is an 
important one. If, as mentioned above, the problem is solved by  
setting up a range of compensation options for each class of cases,  
it would be hard to argue for spontaneity and imprudence; we would 
be left with another problematic division of negligence law based  
on classes of cases, as can be seen from analysis of the ORP and  
its application. 
 Apart from this, even if there were no problems from the point of 
view of optimal deterrence regarding offsetting risks, in some of the 
categories in which the ORP would apply (such as that of a lawyer 
representing both parties in an apartment purchase or offsetting en-
vironmental risks from bodily risks), optimal deterrence should be 
suitably restricted by the moral considerations of corrective justice. 
Even then, the application of a moral outcome leads to the nonappli-
cation of the ORP. This creates another problem from the point of 
view of an additional subdivision in negligence law. 
 To sum up, one should not ignore that the ORP, as proposed by 
Porat, appears adverse to most of the goals of tort law. It is no won-
der that Porat attempts to find supplementary mechanisms such as 
social or private insurance, but even these solutions are inherently 
problematic, especially given their incompatibility with the underly-
ing goals of tort law. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION
 According to the ORP as presented by Porat, the risk actually rea-
lized by the negligent choice of a certain course of action is offset 
against the risk that was not realized from another course of action 
with a lower expected harm. The only liability imposed on the injurer 
is the differential that results by offsetting these risks. This prin-
ciple, which was meant to solve or lessen the defensive medicine 
problem and thus to reduce costs, and which Porat carefully proposes 
to extend to all cases of negligence, raises serious questions, both 
theoretical and practical. 
 In this Article, the ORP has been criticized from numerous pers-
pectives. This critique is not limited to its basic adversity to most of 
the goals of tort law. Even if the principle was consistent with all of 
these goals, it seems that many practical fissures remain at its core. 
The principle is both inherently and fundamentally flawed to the ex-
tent that it is doubtful if it is possible to apply it in practice, or even 
in approximation.123
 Even if the principle’s application were feasible, it appears that it 
would actually increase litigation costs and evidentiary barriers giv-
en the need to employ the services of additional expert witnesses in 
the fields of medicine and statistics as a matter of routine. It would 
not only require that the victim go through the trouble of suing the 
injurer, but would also require that he file a claim against the social 
or private insurer, if he can afford such private insurance, to supple-
ment his compensation. Significant criticism was also applied to this 
solution, and it was proposed, as a default if the ORP is to be applied, 
that the stronger party (doctor, insurance) would be required to fully 
compensate the injured party, and only then to turn to the injured par-
ty’s insurance company to obtain indemnification for the difference.  
 Finally, this Article does not argue that the present state of the 
law of negligence in general, and medical malpractice in particular, is 
satisfactory. However, any proposal to convert the field of medical 
malpractice into a regime of strict liability or the like demands a sep-
arate discussion124 and examination of additional proposals that have 
                                                                                                                    
 123. Other suggestions that were raised for the problem of defensive medicine should 
be dealt with separately. See Hylton, supra note 1, at 1, 5 (agreeing in principal with Porat 
and Cooter’s suggestions for the problem of defensive medicine, disagreeing with them only 
at the level of some of the details and suggesting some alternative solutions, among them 
the adoption of a more careful analysis of factual causation or reducing the likelihood of ju-
dicial error—for example by having medical professionals serve as neutral expert advisors 
to courts). In any event, these solutions are specific to cases of medical malpractice, which 
are the basis of Cooter and Porat’s article, and are not relevant to all cases of negligence, as 
can be seen from Porat’s proposal in his later articles. See Cooter & Porat, supra note 1. 
 124. See Porat, supra note 1, at 273-75 (attempting to present other alternatives, which 
are less satisfactory in his view, but from the outset noting that an extensive discussion of 
these alternatives is beyond the scope of the questions discussed in his article). 
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already been raised.125 Given that there is, in practice, underen-
forcement since most injured patients do not sue, one could expect so-
lutions that would incentivize the filing of suits and getting full com-
pensation. If defensive medicine, the elimination of which underlies 
the idea of the ORP, is indeed so bad, maybe the prevailing situation 
is the lesser of two evils and better than any other alternative.  
 Part of the risk management carried out by large bodies such as 
hospitals, health services, and their insurers is aimed at decreasing 
risks in a positive and effective way through the improvement of 
safety and not by exposing the patient to new risks created by over-
defense. Indeed, not all risk management is defensive medicine. But 
despite this, the defensive medicine phenomenon exists, even if only 
in certain areas. Notwithstanding the desire to solve difficult prob-
lems existing in the field of medical malpractice (if we accept the as-
sumption that these offer no advantages), and especially through a 
principle that, in a sense, was proposed to apply to the laws of negli-
gence in general, it seems that the ORP has too many underlying 
problems for it to represent an appropriate solution. Nevertheless, if 
the inherent problems in the basis of the ORP could be solved, or at 
least lessened, and the extent of the difference proven, even if only in 
rough estimation, there may be a place to implement this innovative 
principle in practice. In the present situation, given the problems 
that it raises, it is hard to believe that these difficulties can be over-
come, and the ORP be made consistent with the goals of tort law. 
                                                                                                                    
 125. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation 
in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz  
and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137 (2000) (proposing a unique solution for bodily  
injury cases).
